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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
ARTICLE
ETHICAL DISCRETION IN LAWYERING
William H. Simon*
In this Article, Professor Simon argues that conventional approaches to
legal ethics are too categorical. Rather than operating within a system of
formalized ethical rules, he argues, lawyers should exercise judgment and
discretion in deciding what clients to represent and how to represent them.
In exercising this discretion, lawyers should seek to "do justice." They
should consider the merits of the client's claims and goals relative to those
of opposing parties and other potential clients. They should also consider
the substantive merits of the client's claims and the reliability of the standard
legal procedures for resolving the problem at hand. Professor Simon also
defends his argument against a variety of possible objections that supporters
of conventional approaches to legal ethics might make.

LAWYERS

should have ethical discretion to refuse to assist in the
pursuit of legally permissible courses of action and in the assertion

of potentially enforceable legal claims. This discretion involves not a
personal privilege of arbitrary decision, but a professional duty of

reflective judgment. One dimension of this judgment is an assessment
of the relative merits of the client's goals and claims and those of

other people who might benefit from the lawyer's services. Another
is an attempt to reconcile the conflicting considerations that bear on

the internal merits of the client's goals and claims. In both dimensions, the basic consideration should be whether assisting the client
would further justice.
This Article argues that lawyers should have such discretion. The
argument differs from more prevalent approaches to legal ethics in
rejecting the premise that the legal permissibility or enforceability of
a client's course of action or claim is an ethically sufficient reason for
assisting the client. It also differs from many critiques of prevalent
legal ethics doctrine that appeal to moral concerns outside the legal
* Professor of Law, Stanford University. I am grateful to many colleagues for valuable
assistance. Bob Gordon, Andy Kaufman, Karl Klare, David Luban, Deborah Rhode, Robert
Rosen, David Wilkins and participants in faculty seminars at Columbia University, the University of Maryland, and the University of Pennsylvania were especially helpful.
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system against values associated with the legal role. I The argument
here is that ethical discretion would best vindicate our legal ideals
and contribute to a more effective functioning of the lawyer role.
The argument focuses on the issues of legal ethics that are usually
understood as arising from conflicts between the interests of the client
and those of third parties and the public, although it suggests that
these conflicts are better understood in terms of competing legal ideals.
The analysis considers only civil practice. Although it has relevance
to criminal practice, defending its application there would require
qualifications and elaborations that would take it too far afield.
Throughout most of the discussion I do not distinguish between
ethical analysis relevant to a regulatory body promulgating rules of
professional conduct and analysis relevant to an individual lawyer
operating within the limits of promulgated rules. The argument is
designed for both contexts. It has implications for how disciplinary
rules should be framed. Because such rules are likely to leave a good
deal of autonomy to individual lawyers, however, the argument also
suggests how decisions should be made within the range of that autonomy.
Part I sketches some premises of contemporary discussions of legal
ethics. Part II describes the contrasting premises of what I call the
discretionary approach. Part III then responds to objections to the
discretionary approach that might be raised from the perspective of
the prevailing doctrine.

I.

CONVENTIONAL DISCOURSE:

Two

MODELS

Consider two crude models designed to evoke some familiar tendencies of lawyers' discussions of ethical decisionmaking. The first
model emphasizes the lawyer's role as advocate and her duty of loyalty
to the client; the second emphasizes the lawyer's role as officer of the
2
court and her duty of loyalty to the public.
See, e.g., A. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 90-155
(ig8o); Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HuM. RTS. x (1975). I
now think that I was mistaken to argue in an earlier article that the critique of conventional
advocacy presented there required abandoning the lawyer's professional role. See Simon, The
Ideology of Advocacy: ProceduralJustice and ProfessionalEthics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29. With
that major qualification, however, the ethical approach defended in this Article is an elaboration
of what I previously called "non-professional advocacy." See id. at 130-44.
2 For a critical exposition of the jurisprudential foundations of the models under the rubrics
of "positivism" and "purposivism" respectively, see Simon, cited above in note I, at 39-91; see
also Leubsdorf, Three Models of Professional Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 1021, 1026-45
(1982) (contrasting "market" and "public utility" models of legal reform).
The reader who is impatient with models, "ideal types," and heuristic simplifications of this
sort might well skip this Part. My main purpose in this Article is not to criticize directly the
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The first might be called the libertarian approach. Its basic maxim
is that the lawyer is obliged -

or at least authorized -

to pursue

any goal of the client through any arguably legal course of action and
to assert any nonfrivolous legal claim. In this approach, the only
ethical duty distinctive to the lawyer's role is loyalty to the client.
Legal ethics impose no direct responsibilities to third parties or the
public other than those the system imposes on citizens generally.
The libertarian approach privileges procedure over substance. It
legitimates conduct that is authorized by procedural rules but undercuts substantive rules - for example, pleading the statute of frauds
to defeat the enforcement of a contract or invoking litigation rules
that create delay and expense in order to encumber the enforcement
of a substantively valid claim. The libertarian approach also privileges form over purpose by authorizing appeals to interpretations of
rules that frustrate the purposes of the rules. For example, it legitimates tax avoidance devices that, while arguably permitted by the
language of the statutes, are contrary to the legislative intent. And it
permits a party to a contract to take advantage of the contractual
language in ways that thwart the expectations of the other party.
The libertarian approach also privileges narrow ways of framing
ethical issues over broad ones. It tends to construe legal norms to
regulate minimally, permitting nonlegal advantages and disadvantages
to exercise a relatively broad influence over the resolution of legal
controversies. As long as an advantage or disadvantage cannot be
traced to specific unlawful conduct on the part of the lawyer or client,
the libertarian approach imposes no duty to compensate for it. Thus,
the lawyer for a corporate defendant is free to take advantage of the
greater risk-aversion of an individual plaintiff in negotiating a settlement. Lawyers for relatively wealthy clients may invoke procedures
in order to impose prohibitive expense on relatively poor ones, and
publicly subsidized lawyers for poor clients may engage in tactics that
impose expenses on opposing parties required to pay for their counsel.
The second model can be called the regulatory approach. 3 Its
basic maxim is that the lawyer should facilitate informed resolution
prevailing approaches, but to describe and defend an alternative approach. I offer these admittedly crude models to sharpen the comparison and to suggest the genesis of my alternative.
On the other hand, if the reader's complaint is that my proposal, although plausible, is not
as radically different from one of the prevailing approaches as I portray it, I plead no contest.
I think most people do find the discretionary approach different, but it is not important to my
argument to establish that it is.
3 The terms "libertarian" and "regulatory" are unsatisfactory to the extent that they encourage
the jurisprudential mistake of conflating the "regulatory" approach with socialism. For an
example of this mistake, see D'Amato & Eberle, Three Models of Legal Ethics, 27 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 761, 770-72 (1983). In fact, the regulatory approach has no necessary connection to any
particular type of economic system. The most distinctive feature of the regulatory approach is
fidelity to substantive legal norms. In a capitalist society, these norms would be capitalist. It

IO86

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol.

IO83

of the substantive issues by the responsible officials. The regulatory
model privileges substance over procedure. It sees the lawyer's basic
function as contributing to the enforcement of the substantive law,
and it inclines toward forbidding her to use procedural rules in ways
that frustrate the enforcement of substantive norms. The most important way it does so is by giving the lawyer strong responsibilities
as a distiller and transmitter of information. Her basic duty is to
clarify the issues in ways that contribute to a decision on the merits,
not to manipulate information to serve the client's goals. The job still
involves advising the client on ways to advance her interests and
presenting the client's case, but it also involves a duty to develop and
disclose adverse information that would be important to the responsible official. The duty applies in negotiation as well on the theory
that disclosure is likely to move settlements closer to the resolution
that the responsible officials would have imposed.
The regulatory approach tends to privilege purpose over form. It
understands the enforcement task in terms of the purposes expressed
in the articulated law. And it tends to privilege broad ways of framing
issues over narrow ones. It refuses to exempt the lawyer from responsibility for circumstances that impede enforcement merely because
her conduct has not affirmatively contributed to them. In particular,
it imposes affirmative duties to share information and to correct misunderstanding.
Despite their opposed perspectives, the libertarian and regulatory
models share a common style of reasoning. The style might be called
categorical, by which I mean simply the practice of restrictively specifying the factors that a decisionmaker may consider when she confronts a particular problem. In the categorical style, a rigid rule
dictates a particular response in the presence of a small number of
factors. The decisionmaker has no discretion to consider factors she
encounters that are not specified or to evaluate specified factors in
any way other than that given in the rule.
The libertarian and the regulatory approaches are categorical in
two important respects. First, under both approaches, the lawyer has
little or no discretion to consider whether there might be legal reasons
why a particular course of action should not be pursued or a particular
claim not enforced, even though the course is legally permissible or
the claim potentially enforceable. Under the libertarian approach, the
lawyer can consider only whether the course or claim is arguably
permissible or enforceable. The regulatory approach has a more demanding standard; it rejects some justifications that would satisfy

has even been argued that a capitalist system requires something like a regulatory approach to
lawyering. See Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U.L. REV. (forthcoming 1988); see
also infra pp. 1134-35 (discussing American precedents for the regulatory approach).
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libertarians - those relying on applications of procedural norms that
thwart substantive ones or on appeals to form that frustrate purpose.
Yet even the more ambitious formulations of the regulatory approach
preclude consideration of many factors that bear on the legal appropriateness of assisting with the claim or action, including notably those
discussed below under the rubric "relative merit."
Second, the dominant approaches are categorical in that they respond to the recurring tensions of legal ethics - substance versus
procedure, purpose versus form, and broad versus narrow framing by privileging some elements over others. The libertarian approach
privileges procedure, form, and narrow framing; the regulatory approach privileges substance, purpose, and broad framing. This privileging need not amount to a dogmatic refusal to acknowledge the
competing elements. Rather, it can take the form of insisting on strong
presumptions designed to restrict judgment in ways that often preclude
lawyers from taking the actions that seem most legally appropriate in
particular circumstances.
Hardly anyone subscribes to the libertarian or the regulatory approaches in the unqualified form that I have described. Yet the
tendencies these models represent are influential. They function, often
tacitly, as basic starting points. For example, the libertarian approach
figures importantly in the norms of "represent[ing] a client zealously
within the bounds of the law" of the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility.4 The regulatory approach resembles Marvin Frankel's
5
proposals for truth-focused advocacy.
To be sure, the Code adds qualifications to the "arguably legal"
maxim, such as the prohibition of explicit misrepresentation even
when not independently unlawful and the duty to disclose adverse
legal authority to the court. 6 At the same time, Frankel's truthfocused advocacy is qualified by a duty of confidentiality. 7 And many
people have tried to combine the two approaches by suggesting, for
example, that the libertarian approach is suitable for contested litigation, whereas the regulatory approach is appropriate for negotiation

4 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (ig8o) [hereinafter MODEL
CODE]; see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 comment (i983) [hereinafter
MODEL RULES] ("The advocate has a duty to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the

client's cause ....
The law, both procedural and substantive, establishes the limits within
which an advocate may proceed."). For examples of the libertarian approach to legal ethics,
see M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975), and Pepper, The

Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 613.
5 See Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1031 (1975).
6 See MODEL CODE, supra note 4, DR 7-Io2(A)(5) (misrepresentation); id. DR 7-1o6(B)(I)

(adverse legal authority).
7 See Frankel, supra note 5, at 1057-58 (proposing a disclosure rule with an exception for
matters subject to evidentiary privilege).
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or ex parte proceedings. 8 Moreover, many of the norms of the Code
and perhaps most of those of the Model Rules are not categorical.
Indeed, some of these norms take a form that seems virtually the
opposite of categorical. These norms, which might be called private,
contemplate decisions exempt from review and discipline in accordance with unspecified and perhaps (although this is ambiguous) extralegal standards. 9 Some of the advocacy norms responsive to the
interests of third parties, such as the rule that the lawyer "may" make
disclosures necessary to prevent her client from causing serious physical harm, take the form of private norms.10
Still, crude as they are, the two models are useful heuristics. They
evoke general background ideals that animate discussion of more
concrete issues. As practical precepts, their basic maxims function as
strong presumptions. The qualifications are important, but they are
just that - qualifications to a governing principle. In the absence of
a specifically applicable rule, discussion tends to resort to one or the
other of the basic maxims.
Moreover, despite the many noncategorical rules in the Code and
the Model Rules, there remains a tendency to treat the issues considered in this essay - those seen in terms of conflicts between the
interests of clients and those of third parties and the public - in
categorical terms. The norms that bear most importantly on these
issues do tend to be relatively categorical.'
These include the Code's
requirement that the lawyer pursue "lawful [i.e. arguably legal] objectives of his client through reasonably available means permitted by
law" subject only to a few narrowly defined exceptions, 12 and the
confidentiality norms of both the Code and the Model Rules that
prohibit disclosure of adverse information subject only to narrowly
specified exceptions. 13 This categorical tendency is also reflected in
8 Cf. Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyers' Ethics in fegotiation, 35 LA. L. REV. 577 (1975)
(arguing for a regulatory approach in negotiation); MODEL RULES, supra note 4, Rule 3.3(d)
(prescribing a duty in ex parte proceedings to "inform the tribunal of all material facts known
to the lawyer which will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision").
9 See MODEL RULES, supra note 4, Scope, para. x (stating that "[n]o disciplinary action
should be taken when the lawyer chooses not to act or acts within the bounds of such discretion
[afforded by private norms]").
10 See id. Rule i.6(b)(i); see also id. Rule I.I3(c) (stating that the lawyer for an organization
"may" resign if the organization's officers insist upon a course of action that is clearly illegal
and harmful to the organization). Another example of a private norm is the rule stating that a
lawyer "may refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably believes is false." Id. Rule
3-3(c).
I Cf. Hazard, Legal Ethics: Legal Rules and ProfessionalAspirations, 30 CLEV. ST. L. REv.
571, 574 (1982) (praising the Model Rules for "provid[ing] a black letter rule ... of the lawyer's
legal obligations").
12MODEL CODE, supra note 4, DR 7-ioi(A)(i); see also id. EC 7-4 (allowing a lawyer to
"urge any permissible construction of the law favorable to his client").
13 See id. DR 4-101; MODEL RULES, supra note 4, Rules 1.6, 3.3.
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some of the norms designed to protect third parties or the public, such
as the prohibition of lawyer misrepresentation 14 and the duty to disclose adverse legal authority in certain circumstances. 1 5 The private
norms that bear on matters of advocacy are clearly subordinate to
categorical ones. The boundaries of decision are defined by related
categorical norms, and analysis focuses on the boundaries. The private norms seem to have relatively little content of their own. 16
When lawyers put aside the parsing of the rules and engage in
more open-ended discussion of the issues of advocacy, they tend to
assume that issues should be resolved in terms of categorical judgment, even when they differ over the correct resolution of specific
issues. For example, consider an exchange between Monroe Freedman and Geoffrey Hazard over whether a lawyer representing the
husband in a divorce case must disclose income that the husband has
concealed from the wife. As Freedman tells the story, the "wife is
represented by a so-called 'bomber' who has no value in life other
than stripping the husband of every penny and piece of property that
he has, at whatever cost to the personal relations and children, or
anything else."1 7 Hazard points out that he could retell the story with
the wife and children out in the rain and snow while the husband
luxuriates in the Caribbean. Hazard expresses the common premise
of the categorical approaches when he concludes that "you can't have
it both ways.... You can't make these cases turn on the underlying
merits. We are talking about, in the fundamental sense, the procedural rule."' 8 Freedman would be the last to disagree about the need
for a rigid rule, but for him the appropriate rule is "don't disclose"
rather than, as for Hazard, "disclose."' 9 By contrast, the central
14 See MODEL CODE, supra note 4, DR I-Io2(A)(4), 7-IO2(A)(5); MODEL RULES, supra note

4, Rule 4. 1
isSee MODEL CODE, supra note 4, DR 7-io6(B)(I); MODEL RULES, supra note 4, Rule
3.3(a)(3).

16 See A. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 817-21 (2d ed. 1984)
(discussing the problems of ambiguity and standardlessness in the Code's private norms).

When the drafters of the Model Rules purport to accommodate "difficult issues of professional
discretion [that] must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral
judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the Rules," MODEL RULES, supra note 4,
Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities, para. 8, I think they are correct with respect to issues
of advocacy only to the extent they refer to what I call private norms rather than discretionary
norms as I define them below. There are some discretionary norms in the Model Rules, but
most of them concern matters other than advocacy. See, e.g., id. Rule 1.5(a) (prescribing that
"[a] lawyer's fee shall be reasonable" and giving a nonexclusive list of factors to be considered
in assessing reasonableness).
17A Gathering of Legal Scholars to Discuss "Professional Responsibility and The Model
Rules of Professional Conduct," 35 U. MIaMI L. REv. 639, 652-53 (Ig8i) [hereinafter Gathering].
IsId. at 654.

19 See id. at 652-53, 654. In the case discussed by Freedman and Hazard, the concealment
involved client perjury, and Hazard's rule apparently would apply only to cases in which this
factor is present.
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thrust of the approach defended in this essay is to insist that the
decision should often turn on "the underlying merits."

I.

THE DISCRETIONARY APPROACH

The basic maxim of the approach I propose is this: The lawyer
should take those actions that, considering the relevant circumstances
of the particular case, seem most likely to promote justice. This "seek
justice" maxim suggests a kind of noncategorical judgment that might
be called pragmatist, ad hoc, or dialectical, but that I will call discretionary. 20 "Discretionary" is not an entirely satisfactory term; I do
not mean to invoke its connotations of arbitrariness or nonaccountability, but rather its connotations of flexibility and complexity. Unlike
the private norms of the Code and Model Rules, discretionary norms,
as I define them, do not connote standardlessness and nonreviewability. I use the term in what Ronald Dworkin calls "a weak sense" to
indicate that the relevant norms "cannot be applied mechanically but
'2 1
demand the use of judgment."
In the context of professional responsibility, lawyers tend to be
skeptical that judgments applying abstract ideals to particular cases
could be anything but arbitrary. Yet lawyers also tend to regard
discretionary judgment as plausible in the context of the judicial role.
The kind of complex, flexible judgment proposed here has been extensively defended against more categorical styles in some of the bestknown literature of judicial decisionmaking. 22 Although this portrayal
has been challenged, it has gained wide acceptance, even among
20 The following excerpt from a leading trial practice text illustrates the discretionary "seek
justice" maxim. Although exceptional among mainstream legal ethics writings in its explicitly
noncategorical stance, it suggests that the approach advocated here is not entirely alien to
practice.
Consider the use of surprise tactics .... The Code of Professional Responsibility does
not refer to the use in general of surprise tactics, but clearly the use of such tactics to
defeat an admittedly just claim or defense is not supportable. On the other hand, the
use of surprise to expose falsification is clearly justifiable .... It is in some such "intermediate" form that the problem of professional responsibility usually arises. . . . Probably
the answer implicit in prevailing practice is that it is permissible to use any legally
supportable ground of claim or defense; though it is a surprise move, to uphold a position
you believe just, whatever the basis of your belief may be.
R. KEETON, TRIAL TACTICS AND METHODS 4-5 (1973); see also White, Machiavelli and the
Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation, 198o AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 926, 927-28
(ig8o) (arguing that categorical norms forbidding lying during negotiations are ethically implausible and inconsistent with prevalent practices).
21 R. DwoRcIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 31 (1977). Alan Goldman's account of legal
ethics, cited above in note I, and David Luban's Lawyers and Justice (forthcoming 1988)
emphasize discretionary judgment in the sense that I use the term.
22 See, e.g., B. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); R. DWORKIN,
supra note 21; H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (tent. ed. 1958).
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lawyers hostile to this style of decision in legal ethics. 2 3 The preference for categorical reasoning in the lawyering context reflects nothing
more than a failure to carry through to the lawyering role the critique
of formalism, mechanical jurisprudence, and categorical reasoning
that has been applied to the judicial role throughout this century.
Another pertinent context in which lawyers have been relatively
willing to accept the possibility of meaningful discretionary judgment
is that of the public prosecutor. 24 Indeed, my formulation of the basic
maxim of the discretionary approach has been partly inspired by the
maxim the Code prescribes for the prosecutor: "The responsibility of
a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty
'2 5
is to seek justice, not merely to convict.
To propose a style of ethical judgment for private lawyers analogous to that familiarly associated with judges or prosecutors is not to
say that lawyers should act as if they were judges or prosecutors.
The analogy is to the style of judgment, not necessarily to the particular decisions that judges and prosecutors make. The discretionary
approach incorporates much of the traditional lawyer role, including
the notion that lawyers can serve justice through zealous pursuit of
clients' goals. Although it assumes a public dimension to the lawyer's
role as well, that dimension is grounded in the lawyer's age-old claim
to be an "officer of the court" and in notions about the most effective
integration of the lawyering role with other roles in the legal system.
There are two dimensions to the judgment that the discretionary
approach requires of the lawyer. The first is an assessment of the
relative merits of the client's goals and claims and the goals and claims
of others whom the lawyer might serve. The second is an effort to
confront and resolve the competing factors that bear on the internal
merits of the client's goals and claims.

23 Lon Fuller, one of the preeminent advocates of the discretionary style in the judicial
sphere, helped draft the categorical lawyering norms of the Code. For criticisms of his arguments
in defense of the Code, see Part I, section I below.
24 The ideal of prosecutorial discretion as informal judgment that considers how complex,

often vaguely formulated public norms should apply in particular circumstances is defended in
M. KADISH & S. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY 80-85 (1973), and in K. GREENANVALT,
CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY 348-56 (1987). For a descriptive account that sympathetically portrays such judgment in practice, see Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion - A
Comment, 6o Nw. U.L. REv. 174, 174-93 (1965). The ideal is not, however, universally
accepted.

See, e.g., K. DAvIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 188-214 (1969) (favoring substantial

categorical formalization of prosecutorial decisionmaking).
Of course, accepting the discretionary ideal of prosecutorial decisionmaking is not necessarily
inconsistent with supporting more institutional checks on such decisionmaking. See Vorenberg,
Decent Restraint of ProsecutorialPower, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1521, 1562-72 (1981).
25 MODEL CODE, supra note 4, EC 7-13; accord ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Standard 3-I.I(c) (2d ed. 198o).
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A. Relative Merit
Neither of the dominant approaches adequately confronts a central
fact about the legal system: most people are unable to enforce most
of their rights most of the time. An important reason is that enforcement requires resources, and the most important resource is professional assistance. The problem is not simply the bar's failure to live
up to its professed commitment to provide assistance to those who
cannot afford it. At any plausible level of expanded pro bono activity,
the problem would remain, because hardly anyone in the society
would want to devote the resources needed to bring us even close to
a state in which rights could be generally enforced. Thus, legal
services are necessarily a scarce resource.
The legal system cannot be indifferent to the distribution of this
resource. First, our legal ideals presume a high degree of continuity
between the prescriptions of legal norms and the conduct of citizens
and officials.26 The scarcity of enforcement resources makes some
discontinuity inevitable, but some distributions of legal services will
create greater discontinuity than others.
Second, some rights or interests are more important than others.
The legal system routinely makes judgments about the relative value
or importance of different rights and interests. In constitutional law,
it distinguishes "fundamental" rights and "compelling" interests from
others for the purpose of delimiting the realm of permissible state
activity, and it weighs the importance of different legal rights and
interests in deciding when the state must provide legal counsel or
other assistance in the enforcement process. In civil law, it weighs
the relative merits of competing interests in formulating substantive
standards of conduct, in deciding whether particular claims warrant
the creation of private rights of action, and in deciding how the
benefits and burdens of procedural or evidentiary rules should be
allocated. Even in criminal law, with its traditionally stronger commitment to categorical norms, decisionmakers often weigh competing
interests, for example, in determining when conduct formally prohibited may be considered justified. A legal system that recognizes some
interests as more important than others should try to distribute legal
resources in a way that protects the most important ones.
Third, the distribution of legal resources is important because the
practical value of some rights depends more on the relative than on
the absolute amount of the citizen's enforcement resources. Such
rights include rights of access to partly competitive lawmaking and
administrative processes (including judicial lawmaking). The citizen's
ability to make use of such rights depends as much on the level of
others' resources as it does on the level of her own. Our legal ideals
26 See

L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 8i-gi (rev. ed. x969).
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support some degree of equality
in the distribution of resources nec27
essary to enforce those rights.
Thus, the prevailing approaches to legal ethics should be faulted,
not for failing to guarantee full access to the legal system, but for
failing to contribute to an appropriate distribution of this necessarily
scarce resource.
The principal area where the dominant views recognize the importance of an appropriate distribution of legal resources is in that of
the public prosecutor. The fact that the public prosecutor distributes
scarce enforcement resources among a broad range of potentially enforceable claims is one of the reasons for both the higher ethical
standard and the requirement of complex, flexible judgment connoted
by the ideal of responsible "prosecutorial discretion." With respect to
private lawyers, however, the dominant approaches hardly address
the distribution issue at all. The only responsibility they impose with
respect to the merits of clients' goals and claims is a threshold one.
The libertarian "arguably legal" threshold is the lowest conceivable
one. The regulatory threshold may be higher, but the number of
claims and goals that can meet this threshold vastly outstrips the
resources available to enforce and pursue them, and the regulatory
approach is indifferent to how legal services are distributed among
such claims and goals.
The proper standard requires not only' a threshold judgment, but
also a relative one. In deciding whether to commit herself to a client's
claims and goals, a lawyer should assess their merits in relation to the
merits of the claims and goals of others whom she might serve. The
criteria the lawyer should employ in making this assessment are suggested by the bases of legal concern about the distribution of services:
the extent to which the claims and goals are grounded in the law, the
importance of the interests involved, and the extent to which the
representation would contribute to the equalization of access to the
legal system.
Of course, merit cannot be the only consideration to determine
how the lawyer allocates her efforts. The lawyer's financial interests
are also necessarily important. But the financial considerations that
tacitly determine the distribution of legal services under the dominant
approaches are substantially arbitrary in relation to the most basic
goals of the legal system - those concerning legal merit. Lawyers
can mitigate the tendency of the market to produce an inappropriate
27 A variety of laws reflect this point, including those restricting ex parte and undisclosed
contacts with officials, those regulating lobbying and campaign finance, and those extending
access to the courts through fee waiver, fee shifting, and the class actions. For a survey of such
provisions in the administrative and legislative spheres, see H. LINDE, G. BUNN, F. PAFF &
IV. CHURCH, LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES 174-220, 263-71, 339-457 (2d ed.
ig8i).
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distribution of legal services by integrating considerations of relative
merit into their decisions about whom to represent and how to do so.
In making such judgments, lawyers will have to balance their legitimate financial concerns with their commitment to a just distribution
of legal services. A lawyer who cannot refuse to assist a particular
client without impairing her ability to earn a reasonable income may
have to compromise her judgments of relative merit more than one
who can say no without great financial sacrifice. It may or may not
be desirable for the bar to prescribe collectively how individual lawyers should strike this balance. The minimum that the discretionary
approach requires is that the lawyer try in good faith to take account
of relative merit in her decisions.
The type of consideration urged here simply extends to conventional practice the kind of judgments many lawyers now make in pro
bono practice. Lawyers who do pro bono work usually choose cases
in accordance with some estimate of the relative merits of the claims
competing for their services. The judgments made in pro bono practice illustrate the possibility of judgments of relative merit, and they
show that financial considerations do not invariably swamp ethical
ones in practice. However, the limitation of this type of ethical discretion to the pro bono sphere is arbitrary. A client's ability to pay
is not an irrelevant consideration, but there is no reason why it should
preclude all assessment of relative merit.
In 1985, Covington & Burling, the Washington D.C. law firm,
decided to stop representing the government-owned South African
Airways. 28 Covington's decision was severely criticized from the perspective of the libertarian approach. 29 The decision seems plainly
wrong from the point of view of the more demanding version of the
libertarian standard, the one that suggests that the lawyer should take
claims that meet the "arguably legal" threshold, so long as the client
can pay and the lawyer is competent and available to handle them.
Other variations on the prevalent approaches would accord lawyers a
personal privilege to decline cases and clients they find distasteful. 30
On the other hand, from the point of view of the discretionary approach, Covington had a professional duty to consider the relative
merits of the claims and goals of South African Airways and those of
others whom the firm might represent, and, if they found the airline's
28 See Marcus, Covington & Burling Drops South African Airline as Law Client, Wash.
Post, Oct. 5, 1985, at C3, col. i. Some background about the firm's work for South African
Airways is given in M. GREEN, THE OTHER GOVERNMENT 196-99 (1975).

29See, e.g., Morgan, Bad for Lawyers, Bad for Lawyering, N.Y. Times, Oct. is, 1985, at
A35, col. I.
30 See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 4, Rule 1.16(b)(3) (stating that a lawyer "may"
withdraw if her client insists on pursuing an objective the lawyer considers "repugnant").
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claims and goals to have relatively little merit, to take the action they
did. 3 1
Let us assume, as seems quite likely, that South African Airways
is implicated in the South African system of racial subordination in a
variety of ways: through its employment and customer practices in
South Africa, through its contribution to an international network of
businesses that enriches South Africa and strengthens the current
regime, and through its participation in the United States in public
relations efforts that promote or apologize for South Africa's racial
policies. Let us further assume that although the representation in
question does not directly involve defending South African racism, it
makes no contribution to alleviating it either.
Given these assumptions, the airline's request for representation
even in conventional business matters should have had a low priority.
These activities support a system that violates some of the most
fundamental norms of our legal culture. Our domestic equal protection laws do not purport to have extraterritorial effect, but they Ido
purport to express our basic commitments (in contrast to, say, our
traffic laws that mandate driving on the right), so that they are
pertinent to any appraisal we might make of extraterritorial conduct.
Moreover, South Africa's apartheid regime violates basic international
law norms that our legal system recognizes. 32 These laws would not
have required courts or agencies to sanction the airline or to deny
it the benefits it sought, but the issue for Covington was not the
threshold one of permissibility or enforceability, but the relative one
of merit in comparison to the claims and goals of other potential
clients. For that purpose, these laws suggest that the airline's goals
33
and claims should be disfavored.

31The analysis in this and the following examples is highly compressed, and even a fuller
elaboration might not convince some readers of my conclusions.

The main purpose, however,

is to illustrate a manner of thinking about such issues, not to support specific conclusions.
32 U.N. CHARTER arts. 55-56; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A
(III), U.N. Doc. AI81o, at 71, art. 2 (1948).
33Courts and agencies sometimes draw on legal norms not directly applicable to disfavor
conduct that is not unlawful in any threshold sense. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574, 592-94 (1983) (relying on fourteenth amendment equal protection cases to
deny charitable tax exemption to private school engaging in constitutionally permissible race
discrimination); TV 9,Inc. v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929, 935-38 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that, in a
comparative broadcast licensing proveeding, norms of racial equality require the FCC to disfavor
applicants without minority ownership participation). This practice is an instance of the more
general one of relying on legal rules that are not directly applicable to inform judgment under
discretionary norms. See, e.g., Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 899-900 (3 d
Cir. 1983) (relying on first amendment cases to invalidate discharge of "at will" employee for
constitutionally unprotected expression as against "public policy"); E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS
§ 12-7, at 835-36 (1982) (discussing common law denial of specific performance for personal
service contracts as against "public policy" based in part on norms against "involuntary servi-
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The goals and claims of other businesses not so radically implicated
in systems of racial subordination would, other things being equal,
have greater merit. And if we broaden the range of potential clients
to include individuals or groups with claims that are a matter of basic
dignity or economic survival, it is clear that there is a vast range of
people whom Covington might represent that have more meritorious
positions. These potential clients probably would be unable to pay
the fees that South African Airways was willing to pay. It might
have been appropriate for the Covington lawyers to give some consideration to any financial sacrifice they incurred as a result of turning
away the airline, but if they concluded that considerations of relative
merit outweighed their financial interests, they were obliged to do as
34
they did.
B. Internal Merit
The second aspect of the lawyer's assessment of merit involves an
attempt to reconcile the conflicting legal values implicated directly in
the client's claim or goal. These conflicts usually arise in the form of
the overlapping tensions between substance and procedure, purpose
and form, and broad and narrow framing. 35
By tending to privilege one or the other of the conflicting elements,
the conventional approaches discourage the lawyer from confronting
these tensions. In doing so, they authorize or require the lawyer to
act in a way that she would concede, were she encouraged to make
a judgment on the issue, frustrates the most legally appropriate resolution of the matter. By contrast, the discretionary approach requires
that the lawyer make her best effort to achieve the most appropriate
resolution in each case.
The discretionary approach does not ignore considerations of institutional competence. It does not assume that the full responsibility
tude"). Thus, it should not seem anomalous to suggest that, even though the conduct of South
African Airways is not directly prohibited by our race discrimination laws, a decision to refuse
to represent the Airways could be grounded legally on ideals underlying those laws.
34 Many believe it improper to represent South African Airways under any circumstances,
either because its claims and goals lack even a minimal threshold of legal merit or because of
extralegal considerations. The point here is that a lawyer cannot fulfill even her purely professional responsibilities merely by deciding that the claims or goals meet a minimum threshold of
merit. She must also consider them relative to the claims and goals of other people she might
represent.
35 In speaking of "overlapping tensions," I mean that every difficult issue of legal ethics
involves all three tensions, but typically in any given situation one seems more salient and
troubling than the others. On the substance versus procedure tension, see Simon, cited above
in note i. On the purpose versus form tension, see Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private
Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685 (1976). On broad versus narrow framing, see
Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REv. 591,
611-42 (i98I).
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for a proper resolution rests on the lawyer alone. It is compatible
with the conventional understanding of the role of judicial and administrative officials in law enforcement. The discretionary approach
is distinctive, first, in treating the premises of that understanding as
rebuttable presumptions that do not warrant reliance when they do
not apply, and second, in imposing a more flexible and demanding
duty on the lawyer to facilitate official decision when the premises do
apply.
i. Substance Versus Procedure. - One manifestation of the substance versus procedure tension is the lawyer's sense of the limitations
both of her individual judgment of the substantive merits of the
dispute on the one hand and of the established procedures for resolving
it on the other. We could tell the lawyer to work only to advance
claims and goals that she determined were entitled to prevail. The
most important objection to this precept is not that the lawyer's
decisions about the merits would be controversial - the decisions of
judges, juries, and executive officials may also be controversial. Instead, the most important objection is that judges, juries, and executive officials acting within the relevant public procedures are generally able to make more reliable determinations on the merits than the
individual lawyer. 36 But the qualification "generally" is crucial. The
lawyer will often have good reason to recognize that the standard
procedure is not reliably constructed to respond to the problem at
hand, and she will often be in a position to contribute to its improve37
ment.
The basic response of the discretionary approach to the substanceprocedure tension is this: the more reliable the relevant procedures
and institutions, the less direct responsibility the lawyer need assume

36 It makes no difference to my argument whether "reliable" is understood in terms of
decisional accuracy, intrinsic procedural fairness, or democratic legitimacy.
37 There are at least three important reasons why this is so. First, many procedures depend
on the initiation of claims by people who lack information about their rights or who lack the
material or emotional resources necessary to pursue their claims. Moreover, most claims that
are initiated are resolved by settlement or default, with little or no participation by judges or
officials. In such situations, lawyers aware of the issues are often the only legal professionals
with any practical opportunity to take responsibility for the lawfulness and justice of the
outcome.
Second, even in cases determined by officials, lawyers often have better information than
the deciding officials about particular aspects of the case or even about the case as a whole.
For example, judges who rule on disputes over the disclosure and presentation of evidence
typically do so with much less information than counsel about the importance of the evidence
in question.
Third, even with full information, the deciding official may not be as well positioned as the
established procedure assumes to make a reliable decision. Perhaps the official is corrupt,
politically intimidated, prejudiced, or incompetent. Or perhaps there has been some breakdown
in the process that undermines the enforceability of the official's decision. For example, its
value may be unfairly discounted by delay, or the sheriff may be unable to enforce it.
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for the substantive justice of the resolution; the less reliable the procedures and institutions, the more direct responsibility she need assume for substantive justice.
This means, to begin with, that the lawyer needs to develop a
style of representation that will, in the general procedural context in
which she practices, best contribute to just resolutions. This will
normally be the regulatory "on the merits" style, but it may incorporate
some elements of the libertarian "arguably legal" style. The distinctive
feature of the discretionary approach is that the lawyer must treat
this style as a set of weak presumptions. Once the lawyer formulates
her general style, she must watch for indications that some premise
underlying her judgment that the style is a good one does not apply
in the particular case and, when she finds them, revise the style
accordingly.38
The most common reasons why some premise will be inapplicable
are an unusual degree of aggressiveness or vulnerability on the part
of another party or an unusual incapacity on the part of official
institutions. The lawyer should respond to such circumstances by
taking reasonably available actions that help restore the reliability of
the procedure. By directing the lawyer to attempt first to improve
the reliability of the procedure, the discretionary approach respects
the traditional premise that the strongest assurance of a just resolution
is the soundness of the procedure that produced it. But to the extent
that the lawyer cannot neutralize or repair defects in the relevant
procedure, she should assume direct responsibility for the substantive
validity of the decision. She should make her own judgment about
the proper substantive resolution and take reasonable actions to bring
it about.
Consider a well-known scenario involving two lawyers negotiating
a personal injury case. 3 9 The plaintiff is an indigent who has suffered
severe injury as a result of the undisputed negligence of the defendant,
but he may have negligently contributed to his own injury. During
negotiation, the insurance company lawyer conducting the defense
realizes that the plaintiff's lawyer is unaware that a recent statute
abolishing the contributory negligence defense would apply retroactively to this case. The plaintiff's lawyer is negotiating under the
assumption that there is a substantial probability that his client's
negligence will entirely preclude recovery when in fact there is no
such probability. The defense lawyer proceeds to conclude the negotiation without correcting the mistaken impression.
38 Kadish and Kadish call something like the conception of role invoked here "recourse role,"
see M. KADISH & S. KADISH, supra note 24, at 35, but they treat it as more exceptional and

problematic (and do not apply it to private lawyers). In contrast, I believe that such a conception
of role is presumed in the conventional ideal of professional work.
39 See G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS 586-91 (1978).
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Gary Bellow and Bea Moulton, who tell this tale, incline here
toward the regulatory approach. 40 Proponents of the libertarian approach might prefer a scenario in which the victim of nondisclosure
is not an indigent and the beneficiary is not an insurance company.
For this purpose, we can recall Monroe Freedman's tale of a divorce
lawyer opposing the "'bomber' who has no value in life other than
stripping the husband of every penny and piece of property he has,
at whatever cost to the personal relations and children, or anything
else."'4 ' The libertarian and regulatory approaches would resolve these
cases through categorical rules, of nondisclosure in the libertarian
approach or disclosure in the regulatory approach. The discretionary
approach requires a more complex judgment.
In the personal injury case, the critical concern for the defense
lawyer should be whether the settlement likely to occur in the absence
of disclosure would be fair (in the sense that it reasonably vindicates
the merits of the relevant claims). On the facts given, it seems probable that the settlement would not be fair. The plaintiff's lawyer
probably set her bottom line well below the appropriately discounted
value of the plaintiff's claims because of her mistake about the law.
Here the defense counsel's responsibility is to move the case toward
a fair result, and the best way to do this is probably to make the
disclosure and resume the negotiation. This duty is triggered by the
fact that, without some assistance from defense counsel, the procedure
cannot be relied on to produce a just resolution. The plaintiff's
counsel's mistake is a major breakdown in the procedure, and since
the case is headed toward pretrial settlement, there will be no further
opportunities for counsel, judge, or jury to remedy the breakdown.
The defense counsel should also assess the likelihood that disclosure will backfire and lead to a less fair result because the plaintiff's
counsel takes this information and then tries to get more than she is
entitled to through some aggressive tactic of her own. But this risk
seems small if, as the scenario suggests, the defendant's lawyer is more
experienced than the plaintiff's, the latter has not been aggressive,
and the matter seems likely to be wound up before the plaintiff will
have an opportunity to make new maneuvers. In Freedman's-divorce
case, things may be different; disclosure may prompt escalation of the
already unfairly high level of demands by the "bomber." If so, then
disclosure might be deferred until future developments indicate
whether the case is likely to be resolved fairly without disclosure. The
lawyer's duty is not discharged, however, until she either makes dis42
closure or the case reaches a fair resolution without her doing SO.
40 See id. at 604-06.

41 Gathering, supra note 17, at 652-53.
42Of course, the lawyers with the information should also consider whether their clients
have some interest independent of the substantive merits of the claims that would warrant
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Now consider a case in which the breakdown arises from incapacity on the part of official institutions. Suppose an experienced tax
practitioner has conceived a new tax avoidance device. She herself is
convinced that it is improper, but there is a nonfrivolous argument
for its legality.43 The lawyer might believe that the Internal Revenue

Service and the courts are best situated to resolve such questions. She
might reason that the agency and the courts have greater expertise
than she, that they are better able to resolve issues in a way that can
be uniformly applied to similar cases, and that they are subject to
various democratic controls. However, such arguments are plausible
only to the extent that the agency and the courts will in fact make an
informed decision on the matter. The arguments do not warrant the
lawyer using the device in a case where the agency and the courts
will never effectively review it. This might happen because the agency
lacks sufficient enforcement resources to identify the issue or to take
the matter to court. 44 In such a situation, the lawyer should respond
to the procedural failure. She can do so by trying to remedy it, for
example, by bringing the issue to the attention of the IRS. If that
course is not possible (for example, because the client will not permit
it), or if it will not be sufficient to remedy the procedural deficiencies
(for example, because the agency is so strapped that it cannot even
respond to such signals), then the lawyer has to assume more direct
responsibility for the substantive resolution. If she thinks that the
device should be held invalid, she should refuse to assist with it. In
these circumstances, she is the best situated decisionmaker to pass on
the matter.
In situations in which the procedure is sufficiently reliable that the
lawyer need not assume direct responsibility for the substantive merits,
she retains a duty to take reasonably available actions to make the
procedure as effective as possible and to forego actions that would
reduce its efficacy. When she need not consider the substantive merits
herself, she should do what she can to facilitate the adjudicator in
doing so.
Take an issue of deceptive impeachment tactics. Is it appropriate
for the lawyer in cross-examining a handwriting expert surreptitiously
nondisclosure. In some cases there may be privacy or proprietary reasons militating against
disclosure. In the personal injury case, however, when the information concerns the status of
a legal rule, it is hard to see any such interest. Legal rules are very much in the public domain.
In the divorce case, the information concerns the husband's finances, in which he should have
no proprietary or privacy interest as against his wife.
43 In the jargon of tax practitioners, she believes that there is a "reasonable basis" for the
device, but does not believe that there is "substantial authority" for it or that it is "more likely
than not" that the device is allowable. Cf. Special Committee on the Lawyer's Role in Tax
Practice, The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, The Lawyer's Role in Tax
Practice, 36 TAx LAw. 865, 866-69 (1983).
44 See Cooper, The Avoidance Dynamic: A Tale of Tax Planning, Tax Ethics, and Tax
Reform, So COLUM. L. REv. 1553, 1577-96 (ig8o) (discussing the "audit lottery").
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to substitute a writing with a signature different from the one the
witness has identified in the hope that the witness will not notice the
substitution and continue to insist on what will then be a demonstrably
mistaken identification? 45 The libertarian "arguably legal" standard
tends to permit such tactics; the regulatory "on the merits" standard
tends to condemn them. Under the discretionary approach, the matter
requires an inquiry into whether the tactic is likely to contribute to
the adjudicator's ability to decide the case fairly. To the extent that
the lawyer has no knowledge that will not be presented at hearing,
the ethical issue will not be urgent because, to the extent the tactic
fails to contribute to a fair understanding of the issues, the adjudicator
can discount it appropriately. But if the lawyer has knowledge or
insight that will not be formulated as admissible evidence, 46 the ethical
issue may be important. Suppose that the lawyer's extra-record
knowledge indicates that the witness is highly competent and the
identification is correct but that the tactic might be effective because
the witness is prone to nervousness and distraction in public appearances. Here the tactic is likely to detract from, rather than to enhance,
the adjudicator's ability to decide fairly. On the other hand, suppose
that the lawyer has extra-record knowledge suggesting that the witness
is not competent and the identification is mistaken. Here she might
plausibly decide that the tactic would contribute to a fair decision.
In this case, the ethical concerns arise from the fact that, even in
a relatively reliable procedure, the lawyer typically has some opportunities to improve her client's chance of success in ways that, were
45 See In re Metzger, 31 Haw. 929 (1931) (categorically holding the tactic improper).
46 The most important reason why probative information is not offered in evidence is that
it is adverse to the interests of the party who has it, and the other side is unaware of it.
However, even in situations in which information is equally available to both counsel, there are
two reasons why lawyers may have significant insight into specific factual matters that cannot
be formulated as admissible evidence. First, probative information may be excluded by the
rules of evidence. This may be so because some rules, such as those of privilege, are based on
considerations other than probativeness. In addition, it may be so because most of the rules,
and especially the hearsay rules, are overbroad: they exclude some probative evidence in order
to obviate ad hoc determinations distinguishing probative from nonprobative items among those
covered by the rule. See J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 226-29 (1825). The

rules presume that such judgments would be unreliable or inefficient; even when this is true
with respect to judges and juries, however, it is often not true with respect to lawyers. The
consequent importance of probative but inadmissible evidence has been recognized in the field
of prosecutorial discretion. See Gross, Loss of Innocence: Eyewitness Identification and Proof
of Guilt, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 395, 407-08, 432-40 (1987).
The second reason why lawyers sometimes have greater insight is their relative familiarity
with a particular item of evidence. Lawyers may spend years preparing a case that the trier
must absorb in days or weeks. In the course of preparation lawyers may develop a tacit
understanding or intuitive feel for some facts that cannot be fully articulated, or they may
absorb many minor but relevant bits of information that cannot effectively be presented to the
trier because of the trier's more limited ability to absorb information within time constraints.
Despite or perhaps even because of this difference, the trier will often be in a better position to
determine the entire case, but the lawyer often has advantages at the level of detail.
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she required to consider the matter, she would acknowledge do not
facilitate decision on the merits by the adjudicator. The libertarian
approach relies on the judge to check such moves at the prompting
of opposing counsel, but the judge, even after hearing from both
sides, is often less well informed about specific factual issues than
counsel. In such situations, counsel should not defer responsibility to
the judge for tactics she does not believe contribute to a fair decision.
Since she has an advantage in assessing the matter, she should exercise
her own judgment and, when appropriate, self-restraint.
Thus, far from collapsing the lawyer's role into the judge's, ethical
discretion suggests a lawyer role that complements the generally accepted understanding of the judge's role. The lawyer assumes substantial responsibility for vindicating substantive merits to the extent
that the judge cannot be expected to do so. In other situations, her
responsibility is to facilitate the judicial role.
Of course, one can imagine a procedural context that is so reliable
as to make superfluous the type of discretion urged here: the dispute
will be determined promptly, through an adjudication by a competent
decisionmaker able routinely to identify and neutralize obfuscation
and excessive aggressiveneness, after a hearing at which both sides
are ably represented and adequately financed, governed by rules and
procedures that ensure full development of the evidence and issues,
and where effective relief is available.
It is ironic that conventional discourse about legal ethics should
often treat this ideal situation as paradigmatic. Not only is the situation rare at best, but ethical issues are here unimportant. Since, by
hypothesis, relevant information is fully available and each side can
counter the aggression and deception of the other, ethics collapses into
strategy. No ethically questionable practice would be likely to benefit
the client. Ethical issues arise because actual procedures fall short of
the ideal. One of the strengths of the discretionary approach is that
it acknowledges and responds to procedural imperfection.
2. Purpose Versus Form. - Part of the substance versus procedure
tension could be considered a special variation of the purpose versus
form tension. When the lawyer impeaches a witness she knows to be
truthful, when she objects to hearsay she knows to be accurate, when
she puts the opposing party to proof on a matter the client has no
legitimate interest in disputing, she takes advantage of procedural
rules designed to promote accurate, efficient decisionmaking in a way
that frustrates this purpose. When judges apply rules, we expect them
to take account of the purposes underlying the rules. But the judge
often lacks sufficient knowledge to determine whether the relevant
purposes would be served by applying the rules. The lawyer, however, often does have sufficient knowledge to do so. Nevertheless, the
libertarian approach imposes no obligation on the lawyer in such
situations to see that the rules she invokes are applied in a manner
that takes account of their purposes.
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The argument so far suggests that a lawyer's choice between a
purposive or formal approach to procedural rules should depend on
which approach seems better calculated to vindicate the relevant legal
merits. In most contexts, considerations of merit favor a purposive
approach. Yet the discretionary approach also requires the lawyer to
remain alert for indications that a purposive approach might not
further consideration on the merits. This point merely summarizes
the substance versus procedure discussion in terms of purpose versus
form. It will be useful, however, to consider the purpose versus form
tension more generally because in many situations, especially those in
which the lawyer must take direct responsibility for considerations of
substantive merit, purpose versus form considerations are distinctively
troubling.
Part of the reason for regarding law as legitimate in our culture is
that it embodies the purposes adopted by authoritative lawmakers:
parties to a contract, legislators enacting a statute, judges pronouncing
a common law rule, the people adopting a constitution. But the
legitimacy of law also depends on these intentions being embodied in
the form of rules. By mediating between legislative intention and
coercive application to specific cases, the rule form distinguishes law
from a regime of direct personal subordination to the legislator. The
rules cannot be applied sensibly without considering their underlying
purposes, but the purposes can only be implemented appropriately by
referring to their formal expression as rules.
In practice, such issues often arise when lawyers have an opportunity to shape an activity or a transaction in a way that seems
consistent with a plausible surface interpretation of a rule but that
appears to undermine its purpose. For example, a divorced husband
who agreed upon separation to pay his ex-wife a percentage of his
income for five years might try to save money by making arrangements
with his employer to defer his income until after the alimony period
expires. Or the owner of a fleet of taxicabs might attempt to shield
his business assets from tort liability by holding each cab through a
47
separate corporation.
The libertarian approach tends to license the manipulation of form
to defeat purpose; the regulatory approach tends to forbid such manipulation. The discretionary approach responds to the purpose versus form tension in terms of the following maxim: the clearer and less
problematic the relevant purposes, the more the lawyer should consider herself bound by them; the less clear and more problematic the
relevant purposes, the more justified the lawyer is in treating the
relevant norms formally. Treating them formally means understanding them to permit any client goal not plainly precluded by their

47 See Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 418-i9, 223 N.E.2d 6, 8-9, 276 N.Y.S.2d

585, 588-89 (1966).
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language. "Problematic" purposes are purposes that pose an especially
grave threat to fundamental legal values. 48 The discretionary maxim
is grounded in the practice in our legal culture of attributing an
especially high burden of formal specification to such purposes. The
most well-established examples are those involving criminal penalties
and civil burdens on constitutional rights. 4 9 Other kinds of purposes
that have been considered problematic include those of transferring
interest groups,
wealth to or conferring economic power on powerful
50
and of conferring anomalous tasks on the courts.
Here is an example involving a clear, unproblematic purpose. The
client is a highly paid hotel manager. The lawyer determines that the
client could save a good deal in taxes by renegotiating his contract
with his employer so that in return for a reduction in cash compensation he receives and agrees to reside in lodging on the hotel premises.
The lawyer must decide whether to suggest this arrangement to the
client, or if the client has suggested it, she must decide whether to
implement it. Assume that some institutional failure makes it inappropriate to rely on the IRS to determine the case, so that the lawyer
must take substantial direct responsibility for the substantive merits.
If there is any authorization for the arrangement in the income
tax laws, it lies in a statutory provision exempting lodging furnished
by the employer on its premises when the arrangement is "for the
convenience of the employer" and is "required . . .as a condition of
's
The rule arguably permits the contemplated ar... employment."'
rangement - the employment contract could be drafted to impose
such a "requirement."
Suppose the lawyer interprets this provision to express a belief
that when an employee receives in-kind benefits as part of his job, it
48 When the purpose is problematic, treating the rule formally is appropriate because a
problematic purpose threatens or burdens either a client goal of special significance or some
more general autonomy interest to which the law gives special protection (for example, privacy).
When the purpose is merely unclear, this treatment is justified by a residual background
presumption that private conduct that does not offend public purposes (or private rights) is
permissible.
49 See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (declaring a criminal
vagrancy statute void for vagueness); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (narrowly construing
a statute to avoid granting the Secretary of State the power to abrogate the right of foreign
travel of alleged Communists); H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 22, at 1413-15.
50 See Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills
Case, 7! HARV. L. REv. I, 22-35 (1957); Posner, Statutory Interpretation- in the Classroom
and in the Courtroom, 5o U. CHI. L. REv. 8oo, 8ig (1983).
5' 26 U.S.C. § ig(a) (1982). This example was suggested in M. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 35 (1987).

In order to focus on the substance versus procedure and purpose versus form issues in this
and other examples, I ignore the issue that would arise if other practitioners commonly engaged
in the practice in question. For the moment, let us assume that the contemplated tax plan is
moderately innovative and has not been widely used in these precise circumstances. I discuss
the significance of the conduct of other practitioners in Part III, section c below.
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would be unfair to tax him on their full market value because they
are probably worth considerably less to him, both because he associates them with work and because he cannot exchange them for things
he may want more, as he could with cash. The in-kind benefits
probably have some value to the employee, but to estimate this value
in each case would be administratively impractical, and no plausible
general presumption would be accurate in a large enough percentage
of cases to warrant its use. Thus, according to this theory of the
statute, exempting the income is the fairest practical approach.
Suppose that the lawyer decides that it would not be consistent
with the statutory purpose to apply the exemption to arrangements
the taxpayer has chosen or initiated. In such situations, it is more
reasonable to presume that the taxpayer does value the benefits at the
amount of the agreed salary reduction or at their market value. Even
if this procedure does not entirely resolve the valuation problem, the
difficulty has been created by the taxpayer's own actions. Thus, the
lawyer concludes that the exemption should not be available for the
contemplated transaction.
Suppose further, however, that courts in the relevant jurisdiction
have rejected IRS challenges to analogous in-kind arrangements initiated by taxpayers.5 2 The lawyer's theory of institutional competence
suggests that the court's decisions are more authoritative than her own
views on the substantive merits. Accordingly, she is inclined to decide
that there is merit to the contemplated arrangement. But the analysis
is not yet complete. She still ought to consider the purposive basis of
the court's rulings. Suppose she concludes that the rulings are based
not on a judgment that such arrangements are consistent with the
substantive purposes of the statute, but on a belief that it would be
too costly to determine whether each particular transaction was in
fact chosen or initiated by the taxpayer. At this point, the lawyer
should review her theory of institutional competence. It may be impractical for the courts and the IRS to make such determinations, but
quite practical for the tax lawyer to do so, especially if the lawyer
came up with the idea herself and has not yet communicated it to the
client. Since the lawyer believes that the relevant purpose is clear
and not problematic, she should not proceed with a plan that would
frustrate the purpose.
Now consider a case in which the relevant purpose is less clear
and more problematic. The client is a public assistance recipient
under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program. She
and her child live, rent-free, in a home owned by her cousin. Under
the applicable regulations, the receipt of lodging "at no cost" is considered "income in kind" that requires a reduction of about $i5o in
52 See, e.g., Caratan v. Commissioner, 442 F.2d 6o6, 6o9-si

(9 th Cir. 1971).
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the welfare grant. 5 3 The lawyer has to decide whether to recommend
that the client make a nominal payment of, say, five dollars to the
cousin so that she would no longer be receiving lodging "at no cost,"
and thus avoid the $15o reduction in her grant.

Again, assume that some institutional failure requires that the
lawyer take some responsibility for the substantive merits. Upon
examination, she is unable to come up with a sense of legislative
purpose as clear and coherent as the one involved in the tax case.
On the one hand, the benefit reduction seems designed to reflect the
lesser needs of people who live rent free, and the fact that the provision could be effectively nullified by the type of financial planning
in question suggests that such planning was not contemplated. On
the other hand, nothing in the language of the regulation suggests an
intention to preclude such planning, although it would have been
simple enough to do so by providing for a benefit reduction in cases
of low rent payments of the difference between the rent payment and
the $i5o implicit shelter allowance in the grant. (Unlike the situation
in the tax case, the welfare authorities have already addressed the
valuation issue in a potentially administrable way.)
Suppos6 that background case law and legislative history suggest
that the regulation is in part a compromise between the principle that
grants should reflect the lesser needs of people with low rent expense
and the competing "flat grant" principle that need determinations
should consider only the basic and easily determinable factors of cash
income and family size. The "flat grant" principle is animated by
solicitude for recipient autonomy and privacy as well as administrative
efficiency concerns. In addition, the regulations seem to reflect a
rough compromise between a half-hearted effort by the federal government (which subsidizes the program) to push the states to raise
grant levels generally and efforts by the states to retain flexibility to
lower them in some circumstances.5 4 In this situation, the lawyer has
no clear sense of which course of action would be most consistent
with legislative purpose. It is thus proper for her to treat the regulation formally.
Even if the lawyer found stronger indication of a purpose to
preclude strategic planning, she might be justified in disregarding it
if she thought it problematic. A purpose is problematic to the extent
that it endangers fundamental values. The lawyer might decide that
the claimant's interest in a minimally adequate income is a value of
exceptional legal importance, that the AFDC grant levels provide
53 See, e.g., MAss. REGS. CODE tit. io6, § 304.510 (I987).

54 See A. LAFRANCE, WELFARE LAW: STRUCTURE AND ENTITLEMENT 351-65 (1979); Hoey,
The Significance of the Money Payment in Public Assistance, Soc. SEC. BULL., Sept. 1944, at

3; Rabin, Implementation of the Cost-of-Living Adjustment for AFDC Recipients: A Case Study
in Welfare Administration, i8

U. PA. L. REv. 1143, 1148 (1970).
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considerably less than a minimally adequate income, and that the plan
in question would move her closer to one.5 5 Thus, the lawyer might
conclude that a purpose to preclude such a plan should not be assumed
without an explicit legislative statement of it. In doing so, she might
apply the presumption against a problematic purpose that the Supreme
Court seemed to apply in Kent v. Dulles,5 6 a presumption reflecting
both a judgment regarding probable legislative intent and a substantive policy disfavoring certain purposes by requiring more explicit
articulation of them.
3. Broad Versus Narrow Framing. - This tension arises as ethical
issues are defined. If we define an issue narrowly in terms of a small
number of characteristics of the parties and their dispute, it will often
look different than if we define it to encompass the parties' identities,
relationship, and social circumstances. On the one hand, legal ideals
encourage narrow definition of legal disputes in order to limit the
scope of state intrusion into the lives of private citizens and to conserve
scarce legal resources. On the other hand, making rights enforcement
effective and meaningful often seems to require broadening the definition of disputes. When disputes are narrowly defined, their resolution is often influenced by factors such as wealth and power that,
when we are forced to confront them, often seem arbitrary. Moreover,
55 None of these judgments is beyond dispute, but all are solidly grounded in the legal
culture. Some believe that the substantive rights the Supreme Court has recognized - as well
as the most plausible general theory of American constitutional democracy - imply or strongly
suggest a right to minimal subsistence. See, e.g., Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional
Democracy, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 659. Although the Court has denied that interests in minimal
subsistence are "fundamental" in some contexts, it has recognized them as relatively important
in others. Compare Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (holding that welfare interests
are not fundamental for equal protection purposes) with Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)
(holding that welfare interests are fundamental for procedural due process purposes); see also
Grey, Procedural Fairness and Substatztive Rights, in i8 NoMos: DUE PROCESS 182-202
(J.Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977) (arguing that Goldberg makes sense only on the assumption that some substantive welfare interests are constitutionally protected). Although the
Court's decisions deny a substantive constitutional right to a particular level of subsistence or
to "strict scrutiny" of welfare classifications, they do not rule out the proposed practice of giving
welfare interests sufficient weight to generate a presumption against interpretations of legislative
norms that would impair them.
Determining whether the benefit level in the absence of the plan in question would ensure
minimal subsistence is not easy, but there is guidance available for such determinations. The
most authoritative general standard of minimal need is the federal poverty standard, which
Congress and various agencies use for precisely this purpose. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF

HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, THE MEASURE OF POVERTY 5-7, 14-17 (1976).

The

AFDC grant levels in most states, even when supplemented by food stamps, are well below
these standards. See S. LEvITAN, PROGRAMS IN AID OF THE POOR FOR THE I98oS, at 2-3,
29-32 (4 th ed. i98o). When the issue of minimal subsistence arises in such states, the federal
standards support the lawyer's judgment.
56 357 U.S. ix6 (1958) (resolving statutory ambiguity against purposes that would burden
constitutional interest in travel abroad). King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), in which the Court
strained heroically to adopt a tortured statutory interpretation favoring welfare recipients, might
be understood as tacitly applying the Kent approach to welfare interests.
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the growth of government regulation and civil rights enforcement has
produced a large number of legal norms that regulate broadly the
structures of relationships and organizations. Thus, large scale public
institutional reform or antitrust litigation often challenges and seeks
57
to transform the basic identity of the defendant.
The broad versus narrow definition tension substantially overlaps
the other tensions. For example, in debates that I characterized in
terms of substance versus procedure, Monroe Freedman responds to
regulatory arguments by hypothesizing situations in which candor and
openness may impede the appropriate substantive resolution because
of some procedural deficiency. A famous example concerns whether
a criminal defense lawyer should cross-examine a prosecution witness
who accurately places the defendant near the scene of the crime about
her defective vision.5 8 In Freedman's scenario, although the testimony
is accurate and thus the contemplated impeachment seems irrelevant,
the defendant is in fact innocent but lacks an alibi and is the victim
of some unlucky circumstantial evidence. So the proper resolution acquittal - may depend on the willingness to impeach the truthful
witness. Similarly, in the divorce case mentioned above,5 9 for the
husband to disclose hidden income would aggravate the injustice of
the probable resolution because the wife's lawyer will take advantage
of the information while continuing to pursue a variety of aggressive
tactics of his own. What Freedman does in these examples is to
broaden the frame. The issue initially posed is one of candor about
a specific piece of information. He insists that the matter be viewed
in the context of the other evidence and in terms of the likely incremental influence of disclosure on the resolution. Nevertheless, broad
framing has no place in Freedman's view of individual lawyer decisionmaking. At that level, he adopts the general libertarian practice
of narrow framing. He favors a categorical duty of aggressive impeachment of vulnerable witnesses regardless of the surrounding context. Freedman adopts the broader perspective only when he takes
the point of view of the rulemaker deciding whether to mandate crossexamination in this context.
In contrast, the discretionary approach gives individual lawyers
substantial responsibility for determining whether broad or narrow
framing is appropriate in the particular case. It suggests that the
lawyer should frame ethical issues in accordance with three general
standards of relevance. First, a consideration is relevant if it is implicated by the most plausible interpretation of the applicable law.
s7 See Chayes,
1298-302 (1976).

The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.

1281,

s8 See Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three
Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1474-75 (1966).
59 See supra p. io89.
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Issues tend to be defined more narrowly under legal norms that regulate narrowly. For example, traffic laws suggest narrower framing
than family laws. Second, a consideration is relevant if it is likely to
have a substantial practical influence on the resolution. Issues tend
to be defined more narrowly to the extent that the parties are situated
so that substantively irrelevant factors are not likely to influence the
resolution. Equality of resources and of access to information are
among the more important factors weighing toward narrow definition
under this second standard. Third, knowledge and institutional competence will affect the appropriate framing. More broadly framed
issues tend to require more knowledge and more difficult judgments.
When the lawyer lacks needed knowledge or competence, narrow
framing becomes more appropriate.
Here is an extended example. 60 A wealthy private university has
a collective bargaining agreement with a local union representing its
clerical and technical workers. The workers had previously been
organized as a single-employer local, but they merged with a larger
local representing workers from several employers shortly before the
most recent contract negotiation. The merger was not a success,
however, and the university workers' leaders and the officials of the
multi-employer local agreed that the university workers should revert
to a single-employer local. Accordingly, the multi-employer local purported to delegate its representative function to the reconstituted single-employer local and disclaimed any interest in representing the
university workers. A few weeks later the reconstituted local held an
election of the bargaining unit members in which the new arrangement
was approved by a five to one margin, though with only about fiftyfive percent of those eligible voting. The reconstituted local has not
made or proposed any changes in internal membership rights or in
the terms of the existing collective bargaining agreement.
On the advice of counsel, the university now refuses to recognize
the local or to pay over dues to it under the "check-off" provisions of
the collective bargaining agreement. It asserts that the multi-employer
local could not administratively transfer representative authority without an election and that from the time it disclaimed interest the
workers ceased to be represented. Since the reconstituted local was
not the authorized representative of the workers at the time the election was held, it had no authority to conduct the election, and the
vote was therefore invalid. The university argues further that the
hiatus between the disclaimer and the election and change in the unit's
size, officers, and internal procedures from the transfer indicate that
there is not sufficient "continuity" between the prior multi-employer

60 This example is inspired by events at Stanford University in 1984. Because I have altered
the facts, I offer it as a hypothetical.
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local and the reconstituted one to warrant continued recognition without a certification election conducted by the National Labor Relations
61
Board.
The union regards the demand for an election burdensome, not
only because it duplicates the internal election already held, but because it would be considerably more expensive in terms of time,
energy, and money. The NLRB election procedures give the employer
greater opportunity to campaign against the local and make it possible
for other unions to compete for certification. The local would thus
have to devote a lot of resources to its own campaign. Moreover, the
university might be able to cause additional delay and expense by
challenging the results of the certification election before the NLRB,
a proceeding that could take years to resolve. 62 On the other hand,
the local's only practical recourse for the university's refusal to recognize it or pay over dues is to file a complaint with the NLRB,
which will definitely consume large amounts of time and money before
effective relief can be obtained.
So far, the ethical issue for university counsel seems to be one of
substance versus procedure and purpose versus form. The delay and
expense of NLRB proceedings arise from a procedural breakdown,
which triggers some responsibility on the part of university counsel to
assess the substantive merits of the university's arguments. This argument is not frivolous, but it seems supported only by formal considerations that undercut the relevant statutory purposes. Most of the
argument would have been mooted by an election held before the
multi-employer local disclaimed interest, and there is no reason to
think that the vote would have been different then. The clear reason
for delay is carelessness on the part of the local, but this carelessness
does not seem to have prejudiced anyone. The internal changes accompanying disaffiliation are substantial, but they involve a return to
the old pre-affiliation structure with which most workers were familiar, and there is no indication of worker dissatisfaction with it. The
university's argument thus does not seem supported by the labor act's
purpose that unions be genuinely representative of the bargaining unit.
Moreover, it seems to frustrate another relevant statutory purpose to minimize employer disruption of union operations and intervention
63
into union affairs.
Nevertheless, describing the matter in this way ignores many of
the considerations that are most important to the parties and their
61 Cf. Comment, Union Affiliations and Collective Bargaining, i28 U. PA. L. REV. 430,
440-53 (I979) (discussing the "continuity of representation" doctrine).

62

Cf. Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the

NLRA, 96 HA1Rv. L. REV. 1769, 1795-97 (1983) (discussing the debilitating effects of NLRB
delay in unfair labor practice cases on union organizing efforts).
63 See NLRB v. Financial Inst. Employees, 475 U.S. 192, 203, 209 (x986).
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lawyers. Although the lawyers have framed the issue in their briefs
in terms of only the limited sequence of events described above, they
and their clients understand the ethical issues in terms of broader
perspectives on a complex and longstanding relationship that has
become increasingly acrimonious and mistrustful.
In the view of the university and its lawyers, the local is in the
hands of zealots who are out of touch with the membership. These
leaders prefer rhetorical and ideological posturing to pursuing the
concerns of the rank and file. They have dissipated the union's resources in a huge number of unsuccessful grievances. They have
precipitated costly strikes over issues of little importance to the membership. They have generated hostility around collective bargaining
that has poisoned personal relations within the university without
making any practical improvement in the union's bargaining position.
The members have not been able to hold the leaders accountable
because they have been confused by deceptive statements by the
leaders, because some of them fear retaliation by the leaders, and
because few of them can devote the time and energy necessary to
mount a challenge to the established union power structure. From
this perspective, an NLRB election would facilitate membership reconsideration of its own interests in a setting that provides the university with an opportunity to counter the deceptions of the union
leaders, while the NLRB's presence would undercut intra-union intimidation.
From the perspective of the union leaders and their lawyers, the
university's conduct represents oppressively paternalistic anti-unionism. University officials have been blinded by their biases about what
workers want and by their own preferences for an informal work
environment in which elite professionals have untrammeled discretion.
They thus have failed to take seriously the union's noneconomic demands and have failed to recognize the need for reforms that would
constrain their power. Their hostility towards union leadership arises
from an understanding of the role of the union - one that precludes
all forms of militance and limits it to a narrowly economic and disciplinary role - that is at odds with the one held by most workers.
The university has negotiated aggressively in collective bargaining
even over the most basic concessions and has energetically defended
grievances without regard to their merits. Forcing the union to conduct a new certification election will exacerbate the effects 'of this prior
course of conduct. The unmistakable message - that while they have
a union they can expect an exhausting and expensive struggle to
achieve and maintain every concession - will demoralize and demobilize many members.
If the issue is framed broadly and if the university's view is accepted, the case for the university's aggressive course of action seems
stronger. The chances that the university's course will succeed on the
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merits are slim, and it is certain to impose a heavy burden on the
union. Yet from a broader view this burden might seem justified,
since the threatened representative structure seems a legally inappropriate one.
In some respects, the statute seems to support reliance on this
broader interpretation. Broad framing seems supported by the first
two of the three standards of relevance suggested above. First, the
matter is governed by a statute that regulates broadly; the labor act
is designed to constitute and protect relationships. Insuring representative union structures is one of its principal goals. Second, the
university's interpretation suggests that its aggressive tactics prevent
legally irrelevant factors, such as the manipulations of the local's
leaders and the inability of many workers to invest much time in
union politics, from affecting resolution.
Yet the third framing standard suggests serious objections to this
line of thought. It seems inconsistent with the statute's premises about
institutional competence. The applicable law accords the union a
presumption of representativeness that the employer must rebut by
"'objective considerations. "'64 The NLRB would not consider any of
the impressions on which the university bases its broad interpretation
competent as rebuttal. Even though these impressions are not sufficient for the purposes of the NLRB, university counsel might think
it appropriate to take account of them in deciding whether to pursue
its aggressive tactic. The university might see an analogy between
this approach and the practice of prosecutors of taking inadmissible
65
evidence into account in deciding whether to initiate a prosecution.
However, the analogy is not strong. The university counsel should
recognize that the university has a bias in the matter and that there
are limitations on its knowledge of the union that are more severe
than the comparable disadvantages of prosecutorial judgment. Moreover, the rules that make evidence inadmissible at a criminal trial are
based in substantial part on factors other than a mistrust of prosecutorial judgment, such as concern about police misconduct, desire to
protect confidential relations, and distrust of juries. By contrast, the
requirement that the employer establish a basis for doubting the
union's representative status by "objective considerations" seems intended to prevent the employer from causing the sort of disruption its
present course creates, by precluding reliance on precisely the kind of
impressions its broader view is based on. Thus, on balance, university
counsel should frame the issue in relatively narrow terms that obviate
judgments they are poorly situated to make. As we have seen, their
aggressive tactics seem inappropriate in the narrower frame.

64 Id. at 198 (quoting United States Gypsum Co., '57 N.L.R.B. 652, 656 (x966)).
65 See Gross, supra note 46, at 407-o8, 432-40.
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The question of framing seems less important for union counsel.
The issues for university counsel stem from their opportunity to take
advantage of the burdens that NLRB delay and expense impose on
the union. For the union lawyers, regardless of whether the issue is
framed narrowly or broadly, the appropriate response is to press for
the quickest and cheapest possible NLRB determination. Pursuing
the NLRB proceeding is the best available way for the union to protect
itself against the employer's tactics, and the scenario so far suggests
no reason to doubt that the NLRB proceeding is adequate to protect
the employer's interests.
To illustrate how the framing issue might become relevant to the
union lawyers, however, we could complicate matters by hypothesizing an additional concern about the reliability of the NLRB procedure.
Recall that, aside from its nonfrivolous but weak claim regarding the
circumstances of disaffiliation, the university cannot make the prescribed showing by "objective circumstances" of reasonable grounds
for doubting the majority status of the union. As we have noted, this
constraint on the employer's ability to trigger an election reflects a
belief that neither the employer nor the Board is reliably situated to
determine when a union is no longer representative without objective
evidence. However, there may be situations in which the employer
lacks sufficient evidence but the union lawyer is reliably situated to
make determinations of this sort. A lawyer with a close, longstanding
association with the union would not have an employer's bias and
might have enough knowledge to conclude with confidence that the
employer's claim of unrepresentativeness is in fact correct and that
the "objective considerations" requirement will preclude the NLRB
from reaching this conclusion. In this situation, institutional competence weighs in favor of broad framing. The union lawyer should not
be content to rely, on the weakness of the employer's narrow claim
regarding disaffiliation to oppose the certification election. She should
push the local leaders to submit to a test of representativeness - by
66
a certification election if that is the best way.
C. The Limits of Role and Legality
The discretionary approach is grounded in the lawyer's professional
commitments to legal values. It rejects the common tendency to
attribute the tensions of legal ethics to a conflict between the demands
of legality on the one hand and those of nonlegal, personal or ordinary
66 This conclusion is supported by concerns of duty of loyalty to the members, who are in
some collective sense the union lawyer's "client," as well as by concerns of fairness to the

employer. See, e.g., MODEL CODE, supra note 4, EC 5-18 (prescribing duties to organizational
clients); MODEL RULES, supra note 4, Rule 1.13 (same).
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morality on the other. 67 Although critics of conventional legal ethics
discourse often adopt the law versus morality characterization, its
strongest influence is to bias discussion in favor of conventional, especially libertarian, responses. Typically the conventional response is
portrayed as the "legal" one; the unconventional response is portrayed
as a "moral" alternative. This rhetoric connotes that the "legal" option
is objective and integral to the professional role, whereas the "moral"
alternative is subjective and peripheral. Even when the rhetoric expresses respect for the "moral" alternative, it implies that the lawyer
who adopts it is on her own and vulnerable both intellectually and
practically. The usual effect is to make it psychologically harder for
lawyers and law students to argue for the "moral" alternative. In
many such situations, however, both alternatives could readily be
portrayed as competing legal values.
The specious law-versus- morality characterization is used most
frequently to privilege client loyalty. For example, in the hypothetical
discussed above involving a personal injury negotiation in which the
plaintiff's lawyer underestimated the value of the claim because of a
mistake about the law, the defense counsel's client loyalty option is
often seen as the "legal" one and the disclosure option as a "moral"
alternative. 68 In fact, of course, concern for the plaintiff is strongly
grounded in the belief that without disclosure the plaintiff will be
deprived of a substantive legal entitlement to recover for negligently
inflicted losses. Thus, both options are equally "legal" in the sense
that they are grounded in important legal values.
The discretionary approach does not deny that some issues are
best understood as involving conflicts between legal and nonlegal
moral commitments. In fact, the distinction between legal and nonlegal commitments has some importance in delimiting the sphere of
the discretionary approach, since the approach does not address decisionmaking involving nonlegal commitments. There are currently
no generally accepted guidelines for making such distinctions, and I
am not prepared to offer any here. However, it may be helpful to
emphasize that such distinctions depend on important issues of legal
theory that all lawyers need to resolve (though not necessarily selfconsciously) in formulating their understandings of their role. In particular, such distinctions depend first on the relationship between

67 See A. GOLDMAN, supra note i, at 9o-i55; Wasserstrom, supra note x. Such a characterization seems implicit in the tendency of the Code and the Model Rules to address many
issues concerning a lawyer's responsibilities to nonclients in terms of standardless private norms.
See supra p. io88 & nn. 9-io.
68 I base my claim that this mischaracterization is common largely on my discussions of this
problem with students over several years. Cf. Krash, ProfessionalResponsibility to Clients and
the Public Interest: Is There a Conflict?, 55 CHI. B. REC. 31, 33-34 (i973) (characterizing
challenges to the libertarian approach as based on subjective nonlegal values).
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institutional competence norms and fundamental substantive norms,
and second, on the scope of lawyer discretion within the scheme of
institutional competence. Whether it makes sense to view ethical
conflict in terms of "law versus morals" or the lawyer's problems as
functions of "role differentiation" depends on how these issues are
resolved.
We can get some sense of the way in which theories about such
issues delimit legal commitments and hence the sphere of the discretionary approach by considering two further cases of the sort conventionally understood in terms of conflict between law and morality.
First, recall the discussion above of financial planning, in which I
argued that a lawyer might act more aggressively on behalf of the
welfare recipient than on behalf of the hotel manager, largely because
the relevant legislative purposes stood more clearly against the contemplated plan in the case of the manager. 69 Many believe that there
are nonlegal reasons to represent welfare recipients more aggressively
than hotel managers, and some readers may suspect that such considerations motivated my argument. We can sharpen this issue by stipulating that in the welfare case the legislature has clearly indicated a
purpose to preclude the proposed plan. The argument for the legality
of the plan is almost (but not quite) frivolous, but because the arrangement might pass unnoticed by the welfare department, it could
benefit the client.
Almost all lawyers will give weight to clear legislative expression,
and many would regard it as dispositive of their obligations. However, a "natural law lawyer" in the style of, say, Lon Fuller would
have to consider whether the decisions of the legislature were so
plainly wrong and the values they affronted so fundamental that the
lawyer should disregard the decisions. The natural law lawyer cannot
divorce "his duty of fidelity to law" from "his responsibility for making
law what it ought to be."'70 Such a lawyer believes that a legal system
must meet certain normative preconditions to be entitled to respect
and compliance, and perhaps even to be considered a system of law.
Thus, legal ideals may require that a person repudiate norms that
violate such preconditions even when promulgated by otherwise legally authoritative institutions. Such repudiation is the opposite of
lawlessness; it moves the system closer to being worthy of respect as
lawful.
69 See supra pp. iro4-o6. The two examples show that the law-versus-morality characterization can privilege responses opposed to client interests, although I think this effect is less
typical than the privileging of client loyalty.
70 Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REv.
630, 647 (958) [hereinafter Fuller, Positivism]. See generally id. at 644-57 (arguing that the
law must be internally moral before it may be externally applied). Although Fuller is speaking
here of the judge, he has applied related arguments to the lawyer elsewhere. See L. FULLER,
THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 94-95 (1)40).
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A lawyer in the welfare case who accepted this natural law theory
of legal order would have to consider whether the norm of minimal
subsistence income is so fundamental that it amounts to a precondition
of legal legitimacy. Such a lawyer might reason that a core value of
legality is the autonomy of the individual and that a person who
lacked minimal material subsistence would be so dependent and debilitated that she would be incapable of exercising the autonomy that
legality aspires to safeguard. 7 1 In this way, the lawyer might conclude
that this value is fundamental and hence that norms that violate it
are not entitled to respect.
Even when a lawyer regards the decisions of authoritative institutions as conclusive, she needs to consider the scope of her own
authority within the scheme of legal institutions. In particular, she
needs to consider whether the lawyering role allows her nullifying
powers of the sort commonly imputed to the roles of prosecutor, jury,
and judge, 72 and - less commonly - private citizen (to the extent
that civil disobedience is justified in terms of, rather than in opposition
73
to, legal values).
Consider another case often thought to present a conflict between
legality and private moral commitment. A childless married couple
have agreed on terms for an amicable divorce. The relevant state
law, which has not been amended for decades, provides for divorce
only on grounds of fault, such as adultery or mental cruelty, none of
which is applicable to the couple's case. The lawyer must decide
whether to counsel the couple to perjure themselves to get a divorce,
or to risk encouraging perjury by telling them what the legally favorable circumstances would be before inviting them to describe their
own. Or perhaps the clients have taken the initiative to commit
perjury, and the lawyer discovers it and must decide whether to report
74
it to the court.
In some respects, this case is an appealing one for nullification. It
has some of the features on which Guido Calabresi based his defense
of judicial nullification of statutes: it involves an apparently obsolescent statute that has become of tune with majority sentiment and the
surrounding legal culture, that could not be enacted today, and that
survives because of legislative inertia.7s
Calabresi's argument raises the question of why lawyer nullification
is necessary in addition to judicial nullification. Why not have the
71 Fuller would not have included minimal material subsistence among the prerequisites of
a valid legal order, see Fuller, Positivism, supra note 70, at 642-43 (arguing that only formal
procedural concerns are fundamental), but others have, see, e.g., Michelman, supra note 55.
72 See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); M. KADISH

& S. KADISH, supra note 24, at 45-66, 8o-85.
73 See R. DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 206-22.
74 This example is drawn from A. GOLDMAN, cited above in note i, at 103, 139.
75 See G. CALABRESI, supra note 72, at 1-3, qi-ii9.
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lawyer bring an action on the true facts urging the court to nullify
and grant the divorce? One answer is that judicial nullification is not
an option in most states. But even if it were, judges might not nullify
because they would be unwilling to take the ensuing political heat
from a small but energetic minority that intensely supported the statute. Or perhaps the judges would think the existence of this minority
would make nullification illegitimate. It may be, however, that the
statute is of large symbolic importance to this group, and that the
group has no stake in low visibility enforcement decisions. Thus,
while public general judicial nullification would not be feasible, low
visibility ad hoc nullification at the enforcement level might be. In
this respect, the divorce statute resembles statutes prohibiting fornication or soft drug possession that are routinely nullified by the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, sometimes in anticipation of jury
nullification. Such low visibility nullification is unavailable here; juries rarely decide divorce cases, and the law puts the burden of initia-

tive on private parties to file and pursue an action for divorce. But
lawyer nullification seems quite practical. Perhaps it ought to be
considered justified for the same reasons that justify the more commonly recognized forms of nullification.

Of course, to the extent nullification must occur through explicit
lawyer assistance in perjury, most lawyers would find it unacceptable; 76 at the regulatory level, no court or agency of the bar would

76 To the extent lawyer nullification involves direct participation in perjury, it might seem
to differ from prosecutor and jury nullification in that the lawyer's conduct violates a legal rule.
But cf. M. KADISH & S. KADISH, supra note 24, at 50-62 (discussing arguments that juror
nullification violates the rule that the jury must decide in accordance with the instructions and
evidence). Perhaps, however, the perjury statute is qualified by some norm that justifies otherwise criminal conduct that is "necessary to avoid a harm or evil" when the "harm or evil
sought to be avoided .. .is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the
offense charged." MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(I) (1985). This provision is subject to two

exceptions, the more pertinent of which applies when "a legislative purpose to exclude the
justification claimed . . . plainly appear[s]." Id. On its face, the divorce statute indicates such
an intention, but if the principle of nullification for obsolescence were accepted, it should not
count.
Although professional discourse always condemns direct participation in perjury (though not
in uncriminalized forms of lying, see White, supra note 2o, at 927-28), lawyers occasionally
accept perjury in practice for reasons similar to those advanced in support of familiar forms of
nullification. For example, some years ago I frequently observed respected lawyers commit
perjury in the following circumstances. Court rules required that to obtain a default judgment,
lawyers had to file a sworn affidavit stating that the defendant who had failed to answer was
not away on military service. Lawyers routinely signed such affidavits without any specific
knowledge as to whether or not they were true, though the affidavits strongly implied the
lawyers had such knowledge. Lawyers lightheartedly and without any sense of wrongdoing
occasionally referred to this practice as perjury. If asked to explain the practice, they would
have said that the cost of investigating the defendant's military status would be unreasonable
in light of the small amounts at stake, the very low probability that the defendant had the
protected status, and the ease with which the default could be removed if it turned out that the
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justify it. 77 Still, the nullification analogy suggests even here that
some ethical dilemmas conventionally portrayed in terms of a conflict
between law and morality have legal considerations that favor (as well
as oppose) courses of action involving perjury. Although lawyers
usually conclude that the balance should be struck against such
courses, the fact remains that the conflict arises within the legal culture
itself.
When the practical issue involves tacit encouragement of perjury
or acquiescence in subsequently discussed client perjury, conventional
professional discourse recognizes (and sometimes gives dispositive
weight to) only one legal value favoring acquiescence or encouragement - confidentiality. By contrast, I believe that the significance of
confidentiality concerns is overstated 78 and that the critical legal concerns favoring acquiescence and encouragement in the divorce case
involve legal merit. In the subsequent discovery case, the conventional discourse vacillates between a rule generally requiring disclosure
and a rule generally forbidding it. 79 When the issue is tacit encouragement, most (but not all) commentary disapproves, but disciplinary
regimes leave lawyers a broad range of practical autonomy in such
matters. 80 The discretionary approach suggests that the lawyer's decision in all these situations should weigh all the factors that bear on
legal merit, including both those that suggest that the divorce statute
is obsolete and unjust and the competing factors that emphasize the
presumptive validity of statutes and the presumptive wrongfulness of
perjury. 8 '
affidavit had been mistaken. In effect, the lawyers nullified a rule that they regarded as imposing
an unreasonable procedural burden through a practice that at least some of them regarded as
("technically") perjury.
Robert Post suggests that the willingness to violate some norms in order to vindicate more
important ones characterizes many favorable portrayals of lawyers in popular culture. See Post,
On the PopularImage of the Lawyer: Reflections in a Dark Glass, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 379, 38183 (1987).
77 See MODEL CODE, supra note 4, DR I-102(A)(3)-(5); MODEL RULES, supra note 4, Rule
3.3(a)(I)-(2). Even an authority accepting the general arguments for nullification would likely
conclude that the difficulties of explaining, policing, and adjudicating an explicit exception to
the general prohibition against lawyer perjury would be too great to allow the exception.
78 See infra pp. 1138-4o.
79 Compare ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975)
(interpreting the Model Code to prohibit disclosure of subsequently discovered perjury in all
situations in which it is likely to be discovered) with ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Formal Op. 287 (1953) (dissenting opinion of Brucker and White) (arguing for a
categorical disclosure requirement). Model Rules 3.3(a)(2) and (4) apparently mandate disclosure. See A. KAUFMAN, supra note 16, at 271-72.
80 The best known argument for a lawyer running the risk of encouraging perjury appears
in Freedman, cited above in note 58, at 1474-75. But cf. M. FREEDMAN, supra note 4, at 7o73 (substantially qualifying his earlier position).
s1 For another possible basis for a nullification practice, consider the law and economics
argument that full compliance with some regulatory norms is not an appropriate social goal
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The discretionary approach does not require that the issues of the
relation of institutional and substantive norms and of the lawyer's
range of autonomy within the scheme of institutional competence be
resolved in any particular way. But how a lawyer resolves these
issues will affect how she draws the distinction between professional
and private ethics. In some situations, the lawyer will feel that she
has a professional obligation to some legally authoritative norm that
conflicts with her private, nonlegal commitments. In other situations,
she may feel that her private commitment outweighs the professional
one. But she will feel such a conflict only when she is reasonably
certain that the legal system fails to acknowledge some value to which
she is committed or that the system has conclusively rejected such a
value. Only at this point is it appropriate to talk of her problem in
terms of the limits of "role morality" or "role differentiation." Until
then, the problem remains one of the most appropriate performance
of her role within the legal system.

ImI.

THE DISCRETIONARY APPROACH DEFENDED

This Part responds to some of the objections that advocates of the
conventional approaches to legal ethics might raise against the discretionary approach: that there are no adequate bases for discretionary
lawyer judgments, that discretionary decisions would infringe client
rights or usurp legislative prerogative, that ethical discretion would
dangerously increase unchecked lawyer power, that discretionary judgments would be ineffectual because clients would evade their influence, that the discretionary approach could not give lawyers adequate
guidance and notice of their ethical obligations, that the approach is
incompatible with the "adversary system," that it would threaten the
ability of "unpopular" clients to secure representation, that it fails to
take adequate account of the personal values of trust and loyalty
implicated in the lawyer-client relation, that it would subvert the kind
of cognitive precommitment to the client's cause a lawyer needs to
present the case effectively, and that it ignores the need for and the
constraints imposed by a strong commitment to confidentiality.
A. What Justice?
In sketching the discretionary approach I repeatedly used terms
like "justice," "merits," "fair," and "appropriate" in a way that many
both because the norms, if fully enforced, would be inefficient and because the legislature
probably intended less than full enforcement. See, e.g., Engel, An Approach to CorporateSocial
Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REv. I, 37-58 (1979) (arguing that, when noncompliance would be
profitable because undetected or undersanctioned, it is "surprisingly difficult to construct" a
categorical argument for voluntary compliance).
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would regard as begging the question. If it were clear what justice
and legality meant in any given situation, critics might say, then
ethical discretion might make sense. But in fact, in most situations of
ethical conflict, it is not clear what these ideals require. 8 2 The critics
might argue that judgments of legality and justice are subjective and
arbitrary, that people usually disagree about them, and that one person's justice is another person's oppression. In these circumstances,
the proposal for ethical discretion appears as either an invitation to
anarchy or an attempt to impose tacitly some set of ungrounded
preferences under the guise of legality and justice.
I do not purport to refute these objections. I claim merely that
they are inconsistent with the most basic premises of the understanding of the legal system held by most lawyers, including many of those
who make the objections. As most lawyers understand it, our legal
system depends on the possibility of grounded judgments about legality and justice. Such judgments are not subjective in the sense that
the choice between vanilla and chocolate ice cream is subjective; they
are not arbitrary in the sense that the result of flipping a coin is
arbitrary. They often are controversial, but controversy does not
preclude legitimacy.
In the dominant understanding, judgments about legality and justice are grounded in the norms and practices of the surrounding legal
culture. These norms and practices are objective and systematic in
the sense that they have observable regularity and are mutually meaningful to those who refer to and engage in them. Even when lawyers
disagree about such judgments, they usually do not regard them as
subjective and arbitrary. One indication of this fact is that they do
not articulate or experience their disagreement as an opposing assertion of subjective preference or arbitrary will. Rather, they oppose
decisions on the ground that they are wrong - wrong in terms of
norms and practices that they plausibly believe binding on the decisionmaker. Moreover, they are often willing to accept a particular
decision as legitimate, even when they regard it as mistaken, in part
because they recognize it as a good faith attempt to apply the norms
and practices of the culture.
Although many hold this view of legal judgment, it seems deviant
in the legal ethics context because the view is usually elaborated in
connection with roles other than that of the private lawyer. Lawyers
sometimes attribute the capacity for grounded discretionary judgment
to juries, prosecutors, police officers, and administrators. The one
role for which this capacity is almost always conceded is that of the
judge. The judge's capacity for this kind of judgment has been con-

82 See, e.g., Donagan, Justifying Legal Practice in the Adversary System, in THE GOOD
LAWYER 123, 132 (D. Luban ed. 1983); Krash, supra note 68.
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sidered so fundamental to the legal system that to deny it has been
83
equated with nihilism.
Although there are many competing theories of judicial decision,
most prominent ones converge in repudiating precisely the categorical
style of judgment that characterizes the established approaches to legal
ethics. We can get some sense of this general view by recalling the
role that the case of Riggs v. Palmer8 4 has played for several influential
legal theorists, including Cardozo, Hart and Sacks, and Dworkin.8 5
The issue in Riggs was whether a bequest could pass under a
procedurally valid will to a designated legatee who had murdered the
testator. The court found that the relevant statutes "if literally construed ... give this property to the murderer, 8' 6 but the majority

rejected this construction. The dissenting judges, who did adopt it,
took a categorical approach. They reasoned deductively from the
premise that statutes must be enforced to the conclusion that the gift
must pass. Along the way, they framed the matter narrowly in terms
of a single norm, the wills statute, and only the circumstances surrounding the execution of the will. They interpreted the statute formally -

without regard to its purposes -

and they portrayed their

conclusion as logically compelled.
Contemporary jurisprudence has condemned this reasoning and
embraced the reasoning of the majority. The majority's approach is
discretionary, not categorical. It frames the matter in a way that
emphasizes the beneficiary's conduct as well as the testator's, and that
implicates not one norm, but two - one that legitimates testamentary
disposition and another that holds that a person should not profit from
his wrong. The majority interpreted these norms as expressions of
social purposes and resolved their conflict by asking which is more
fundamental. "One path was followed, another closed, because of the
87
conviction in the judicial mind that the one selected led to justice."
The style of legal reasoning employed in the prevailing approaches
to legal ethics is that of the dissent in Riggs, not that of the majority.
Both of the prevalent approaches resemble the Riggs dissent in their
refusal to confront tension and their insistence on categorical treatment. The libertarian approach in particular resembles the dissent in
its insistence on narrow framing and formal rather than purposive
reasoning.
The dominant approaches to legal ethics thus rely on a style of
reasoning that is widely regarded as discredited in the jurisprudence
83See Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 740-41 (1982).
84115 N.Y. 5o6, 22 N.E. 188 (i889).
85 See B. CARDOZO, supra note 22, at 40-44; R. DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 23-45; H.

HART & A. SACKS, supra note 22, at 89-93.
86 Riggs, 1I5 N.Y. at 509, 22 N.E. at 189.
87 B. CARDOZO, supra note 22, at 41.
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of the judicial role. When we look at the matter from this perspective,
judgment about justice and legal merit should seem more plausible
than it usually does in the professional responsibility context.
Once it is conceded that judges have the capacity for meaningful
discretionary judgment, is it plausible to deny that lawyers have it?
Perhaps it might be argued that because judges are selected from the
meritocratic elite of the bar, they have greater capacity for judgment
than do ordinary lawyers. Whatever one thinks of judicial selection
procedures, this argument does not work. Any plausible conception
of lawyering requires that ordinary lawyers be able to simulate the
decisionmaking methods of officials. Lawyers would not be able to
persuade officials or advise clients on how officials apply rules without
an understanding of the way officials think. Thus, for example, John
"Change places
W. Davis declared as the "cardinal rule" of advocacy,
88
(in your imagination of course) with the Court."
Outside the field of professional responsibility, nearly all discussions of the type of thinking required of practitioners speak in terms
of complex, informal judgment, not of mechanical rule-following.
Llewellyn's "situation sense," Brandeis' emphasis on factual mastery
and customized relation building, and Hart and Sacks' notion of
craft all imply such judgment.8 9 Even the Code speaks of legal judgment in this fashion when it is not addressing legal ethics. In justifying the prohibition of unauthorized practice on the ground that lay
people lack the requisite capacity for legal judgment, canon 3 states
that the "essence of the professional judgment of the lawyer is his
educated ability to relate the general body and philosophy of law to
a specific legal problem of a client." 90 A related precept notes the
importance of "sensitive variations in the considerations that bear on
legal determinations. "91
To say that most lawyers have a serviceable conception of normative judgment is not to say that they share the same conception.
Even lawyers who share the general view exemplified by the Riggs
majority differ widely over such matters as the range of materials that
are relevant to decision and the methodology that should be applied
to them. But any approach to decisionmaking that recognizes distinctions in relative importance among different legal interests and
that recognizes and attempts to confront the tensions between substance and procedure, purpose and form, and broad and narrow
framing is adequate for ethical discretion. The fact that lawyers may
88 Davis, The Argument of an Appeal,

26 A.B.A. J. 895, 896 (1940).
89 See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 203-08 (i96O);
J. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW-MAKERS 339-42 (1950) (on Brandeis);
H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 22, at 229-32.
9D MODEL CODE, supra note

91 Id. EC 3-2.

4, EC 3-5.
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differ in their philosophies of decisionmaking no more discredits the
claim that their decisions about legal merit can be legitimate and
meaningful than the fact that judges may differ discredits this claim
in the judicial sphere.
B. Denying Client Rights/UsurpingLegislative Power
Some people assert that a lawyer decision based on anything but
a clear legal prohibition is wrong when it prevents a client from
obtaining an otherwise available advantage, because it violates the
client's rights. These people usually acknowledge that rights can be
in tension with other social norms because legal rules are an imperfect
expression of such norms. But they insist that the proper response to
such tensions is not to inhibit clients from taking selfish advantage of
92
the rules, but to press the legislature to change the rules.
The part of the argument that appeals to client rights conflates an
opportunity to obtain an advantage from a legal institution with a
right. This conflation might be viable for some purposes if "right"
were a purely descriptive term, but in that case rights would have no
weight in ethical decisionmaking. To invoke the client's right in a
normative sense to hold that clients have an ethical claim to
anything that the courts can be made to yield - presupposes a view
of the legal system that few lawyers take seriously any more outside
the sphere of professional responsibility.
This is not the place for a full-scale critique of that view, 93 but
we can see a couple of its more salient defects by considering the case
of pleading the statute of frauds to defeat a contract claim the client
admits is substantively valid. One problem is that any jurisprudence
that would require the lawyer to plead the statute of frauds in such
circumstances is internally unstable. It would have to be both positivist, in order to insist that the legally dispositive consideration is
that the court would grant a dismissal, and libertarian, in order to
insist that the client has an ethical claim to the dismissal without
regard to the harm to the plaintiff. But the positivist and libertarian
elements seem to undermine each other. The positivist elements invite
92 See id. EC 8-2; Pepper, supra note 4 (elaborating a rights-based defense of the libertarian
approach).
93 This view, most prominently exemplified by the classical legal thought of the turn of the
century, is an amalgam of positivism and libertarianism. For critiques of positivism, see, for
example, R. DWORKIN, cited above in note 21, at 14-45, and L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST
OF ITSELF (1940). For critiques of libertarianism, see, for example, Cohen, The Basis of

Contract, 46 HARV. L. REv. 553 (I933), and Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical

Jurisprudencefrom Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 975. For critiques of these doctrines
as they surface in professional responsibility discourse, see Luban, The Adversary System Excuse,
in THE GOOD LAWYER, cited above in note 82, at 83, 97-IOO, and Simon, cited above in note
I, at 39-61, 74-101.
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us to question why the court's anticipated action is more legitimate
than any other exercise of power, including the lawyer's power to
force her own views on the client. At the same time, the libertarian
elements suggest that there is something wrong with a practice that
frustrates a kind of claim - for benefits promised under a contract
that libertarianism generally supports.
Another problem with this jurisprudence is that it neither respects
nor provides reasons for rejecting the powerful moral intuition that
most people, lay or lawyer, experience in this case: that the plaintiff's
claim involves a right strongly grounded in law. This is not necessarily an intuition that the plaintiff should win, but rather that the
bare notion of right cannot provide a basis for the lawyer's decision,
since there are rights on both sides. In such situations, to insist that
the lawyer secure the client's advantage because the client has a right
begs the question of which of the competing rights is more entitled to
vindication.
The second part of the argument, which directs the lawyer's doubts
about pleading the statute away from the case at hand toward future
appeals to the legislature, sometimes reflects a mistaken conception of
"law" similar to the misunderstanding of "right" in the first part of
the argument. Here the claim is that precluding the client from
obtaining the advantage would be tantamount to making law, and
the power to make law is reserved to the legislature. But few contemporary lawyers would buy this argument. If "making law" means
enacting statutes, the lawyer does not make law by refusing to plead
the statute of frauds. If "making law" means influencing the application of statutes, then it seems clear that lawyers, along with a host
of other actors outside the legislature, necessarily and legitimately
make law. Since laws are not self-interpreting or self-enforcing, their
application to specific cases must be mediated by decisions of a variety
of actors.
In the present case, for example, the lawyer who refuses to plead
the statute might plausibly think of herself as enforcing the substantive
law of contract rather than altering or frustrating the statute of frauds.
A statute that precludes judicial enforcement of a claim does not
necessarily indicate an intent to preclude a sense of right and obligation with respect to the claim. 94 Moreover, the statute of frauds
appears to contemplate that the defense it creates will not always be
invoked when it is available, since the defense is waivable, and the
statute is silent on the specific issue of when lawyers should assist
94 Few would conclude that the rule providing that conviction for murder requires proof
beyond a reasonable doubt means that people are legally privileged to commit murder so long
as they do not leave such proof, or that the rules of charitable and family tort immunity mean
that charities and family members have no legal duty to act with reasonable care.
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clients to invoke it. That issue requires an interpretive judgment by
the lawyer. If the lawyer's goal is fidelity to legislative authority, she
cannot reasonably ignore the substantive law of contract, which provides for the enforcement of promises like the one in question. Assume
that the lawyer plausibly decides that the only purpose of the statute
of frauds is to preclude judicial enforcement in factually disputed cases
where reliable evidence is unavailable. The concerns underlying the
statute, therefore, would not apply to situations such as this one in
which there is no factual dispute. It seems quite plausible, then, for
the lawyer to conclude that legal merit (in this case, legislative purpose) would be best vindicated by not pleading the statute.
The appeals to client right and to the legislature reflect a failure
to absorb the twin lessons of legal realism for legal ethics. The first
and less appreciated - lesson is that ethically-charged legal controversies are fundamentally distributive in the sense that they involve
conflicting goals of individuals. The critical implication of this point
for legal ethics is that the appeal to individual autonomy or right is
not a sufficient basis for client loyalty because it begs the question of
why the client's autonomy or right should be preferred to that of the
person whose autonomy or right is frustrated by the client's activities.
The second lesson is that rules are indeterminate and must be
elaborated in the process of application to particular controversies.
This means that those who influence the process of enforcement,
including lawyers, have a kind of legislative power. They determine
the practical meaning of legislative commands. Many have concluded
that such power entails public responsibility. 95 Whether or not one
goes this far, the realist argument at least precludes the libertarian
from disclaiming responsibility on the ground that it would usurp
legislative prerogative. The lawyer cannot escape involvement in law96
making.
95 Hart and Sacks' attack on the nineteenth-century railroad lawyers who drafted adhesion
contracts disclaiming liability for freight loss is a famous version of the argument that lawyers
have lawmaking power and that such power entails public responsibility. See H. HART & A.
SACKS, supra note 22, at 262-63.
96 Pepper's defense of the libertarian approach is basically pre-Realist despite its discussion
of "The Problem of Legal Realism." See Pepper, supra note 4, at 624-28. Pepper's discussion
considers only the realist critique of the determinacy of rules but ignores the realist critique of
the notion of rights on which his argument depends. Pepper's response to the indeterminacy
point is also inadequate on its own terms. Pepper acknowledges that the counterpurposive
manipulation of legal rules undermines the moral basis of public life. But he argues that lawyers
can counter the anomic tendencies of libertarian advocacy by engaging in "moral dialogue"
about private values and by withdrawing when the client insists on a course that offends the
lawyer's private values. See id. at 630-33. This approach leaves the public problem of anomie
at the mercy of the lawyer's private convictions. It provides no basis for public institutional
review or even professional criticism of the lawyer's conduct. At the same time, in minimizing
ethical constraints on persuasion and withdrawal, Pepper's approach leaves weak clients vul-
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C. Lawyers Too Powerful
Some may concede that lawyers have the capacity to make informal normative judgments but deny the legitimacy of their doing so.
These critics would object that the discretionary approach enlarges
lawyer power in a way that precludes effective checks. For them,
the judicial analogy seems inappropriate because judges are subject
to various power-legitimating public controls that do not apply to
lawyers. With either a little cynicism about the ostensible public
controls on judges or a little naivet6 about the bar's admissions and
disciplinary procedures, one might argue that controls on lawyers are
comparable to those on judges. But the case for ethical discretion
does not require such an argument.
The basic objection is that discretion gives lawyers too much
power, but the term "power" is rarely explicated in such complaints.
What might it mean? Sometimes it seems to mean the capacity to be
arbitrary or to impose purely personal goals, and the thrust of the
complaint is that discretionary norms enlarge this capacity because
they fail to yield clear answers in specific cases. This complaint
conflates a norm that requires a more complex judgment with a norm
that constrains decision less. But there is no reason to expect a lawyer
who makes decisions in good faith to feel less constrained under
discretionary norms than under categorical ones. Like a judge applying a norm such as "due process," the lawyer applying a discretionary
norm may feel less confident about the answer she reaches, but as
long as she is in good faith, she should not feel any more free to be
arbitrary or to impose her own views.
Of course, lawyers will not always make decisions in good faith;
hence in part the importance of disciplinary enforcement. Another
possible meaning of the claim that ethical discretion gives lawyers too
much power is that it increases practical immunity from disciplinary
enforcement. Here the argument would be that applications of discretionary norms are more likely to be controversial among lawyers
generally than comparable applications of categorical norms. If other
lawyers are less likely to agree about what discretionary norms require
in particular cases than they are about what categorical norms require,
then disciplinary enforcement might constrain less under a discretionary regime.
This criticism confuses the ease with which a norm can be applied
with the restrictiveness of a norm. A norm that says lawyers can do
anything they want except steal from their clients is relatively easy to
apply to particular cases, but it is not very restrictive. A norm that
says lawyers must act loyally and competently toward clients may be
nerable to manipulation in the name of private values he denies are a legitimate basis for public
coercion.
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more difficult to apply, but it is potentially far more restrictive. The
great disadvantage of using categorical norms to avoid difficulties of
application is that such norms tend to be both overinclusive and
underinclusive relative to their purposes. Far more than discretionary
norms, they tend to prohibit desirable conduct, permit undesirable
conduct, or both.
It is because of such costs that many of the norms in the professional codes and all of those in the common law protecting clients
from lawyers and other professionals tend to be discretionary. The
most important of these common law norms, of course, is the duty of
reasonable care/prohibition of negligence. Common law negligence
adjudication involves the application of discretionary norms to professional conduct in precisely the manner proposed here. Indeed the
discretionary approach merely extends the style of judgment taken for
granted in the realm of common law client protection to the realm of
intraprofessional protection of third party and public interests. My
impression is that in the former realm the most common complaint is
of excessive rather than insufficient restrictiveness. Moreover, those
who do find restriction insufficient rarely associate this problem with
the discretionary form of the governing norms.
Another meaning of "power" is the capacity to frustrate another
person's goals. Thus opponents of the discretionary approach might
complain that it increases lawyer power by requiring and legitimating
greater intervention in opposition to client goals. We might respond
that any such increased power would be justified to the exteht that it
served legal merit. But there is a more important response: the discretionary approach does not increase lawyer power because any increase in the lawyer's capacity to frustrate client goals is exactly
balanced by a reduction in the lawyer's capacity to frustrate goals of
third parties and the public. Lawyers serve client goals by using
power against others. The discretionary approach puts the lawyer in
opposition to clients by reducing her power to injure others for the
sake of the client.
Still another meaning of "power" might be the capacity: to fulfill
one's own private goals. If the discretionary approach reqthired decisions that coincided with the lawyer's private goals more frequently
than did other approaches, one might argue that the discretionary
approach extended lawyer power. To the extent that lawyers' private
goals and ethical duties coincided simply because of their deep commitment to legality and justice, one might argue that afly power
arising from this fact should not be objectionable. However, it is not
at all clear that the discretionary approach would in fact move ethical
decisions closer to lawyers' private goals. Casual observation suggests
that the private goals of many lawyers run overwhelmingly toward
acquiescence in the goals of clients. These lawyers view increased
responsibility to third parties and the public not as a form of empow-
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erment, but at best as a demanding professional duty and at worst as
an oppressive burden.
Furthermore, there are important indirect controls on the lawyer
power under the discretionary regime. Two of the more important
sources of the lawyer's power are her ability to refuse assistance and
her ability to disclose information to third parties. But the lawyer's
refusal usually will constrain the client only to the extent that other
lawyers go along with her judgment, and disclosure will be harmful
only to the extent that others, usually public officials, act on the
information.
Finally, one of the basic sources of the lawyer's power - the
ability to refuse assistance - is grounded in what most people would
consider a fundamental right to control one's labor. To people not
imbued with the ideologies of legal professionalism, it is bizarre to
find lawyers responding to proposals for higher than minimal ethical
standards by asking rhetorically why a lawyer should "arrogate to
herself" the power to determine the justice of a client's goals. When
the issue is whether the lawyer will lend her efforts to furthering the
goals, this arrogation is nothing more than the right and responsibility
97
of any person who aspires to ethical autonomy.
Thus, the claim that a discretionary approach would dangerously
enlarge lawyer power is unfounded. Ethical discretion does not give
97 Although the discretionary approach is designed to safeguard the lawyer's ethical autonomy, it is principally concerned with those elements of her moral identity bound up with her
commitment to the lawyering role and to the values of legal merit. The discretionary approach
is not especially concerned with a lawyer's purely private moral commitments, although it does
not deny the importance of such commitments.
Thus, for example, the problem of the "last lawyer in town" does not exist for the discretionary approach in the same sense that it does for approaches that focus on private values.
Murray Schwartz popularized this phrase in connection with his discussion of the lawyer who
refuses to assist a client with a claim or course of action that, though perhaps legally well
grounded, is repugnant to the lawyer's private values. Schwartz suggests that the lawyer should
be more reluctant to refuse to assist the client when there is no other lawyer available, since
her refusal effectively will deprive the client of a legal entitlement. See Schwartz, The Zeal of
the Civil Advocate, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 543, 562-63.
The discretionary approach focuses on the situation in which the lawyer declines assistance
on grounds of legal merit. In this situation, there is no reason to think of her refusal as
depriving the client of a legal entitlement. The fact that the lawyer is the "last lawyer in town"
is not a problem; indeed it is an advantage to the extent that the lawyer's judgment suggests
that the goals of the legal system would be better served if the client were unable to pursue her
claim or course of action. (At least this is so when the lawyer decides against assistance on
grounds of internal merit. When the decision is a matter of relative merit, the legal system is
not necessarily better off if the client's goals are not pursued at all, but given resource constraints,
the system is better off if the lawyer devotes her energies elsewhere.)
Nevertheless, the discretionary approach must recognize a related problem. If the lawyer is
not only the "last lawyer in town" but also the only lawyer in town, then her decision involves
considerably more responsibility than where other lawyers are available to consider the matter.
This is not a reason to take the case regardless of the merits, but it is a reason to take exceptional
care in assessing the merits.
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lawyers more power than the conventional approaches in any sense
that should be regarded as troubling. It leaves the most important
checks on lawyer power unimpaired. And the power it does give
lawyers is legitimate.
D. Lawyers Not Powerful Enough
Another charge against ethical proposals more ambitious than the
"arguably legal" standard is that they fail to take account of the
practical pressures lawyers encounter. Clients will insist that lawyers
go to the limits of the law for them, and a lawyer who refuses will
find herself without any clients, since less high-minded colleagues will
take her business away.
There seem to be two concerns here: first, that the ambitiously
ethical lawyer will be unable to earn a living, and second, that the
effort to raise standards will be ineffectual because clients will simply
find other lawyers who will do their bidding. Even if the factual
premises of this objection were true, they would hardly determine the
lawyer's ethical obligation conclusively. If I were defending a racketeer and she asked me to arrange for the murder of the prosecution's
chief witness, no one would consider me justified in going along, even
if she were my only client and I were certain she could hire someone
else to do it. Still, the concerns about the lawyer's financial interests
and about effectuality are legitimate, and there may be less extreme
circumstances in which they should be dispositive. Far from being
indifferent to them, the discretionary approach is distinctively well
equipped to accommodate them.
The discretionary approach treats the lawyer's interest in earning
a living as a factor to weigh in decisionmaking. If a lawyer cannot
earn a reasonable living without undertaking a particular representation, that fact weighs in favor of undertaking it. This consideration
should not support a general lowering of ethical standards, however,
because a lawyer who is financially secure should give it no weight.
The fact that the lawyer's refusal will be ineffectual is also a
legitimate consideration. It is relevant in two senses. First, if the
practice in question is widespread, that is an indication that it may
be proper. The open, widespread use of the practice may mean that
most lawyers believe it has legal merit. The more openly widespread
the practice, the greater the ability of public authorities to assess and
police it, and hence the less the need for lawyers to assume such
responsibility. Also, if the practice is widely available to people other
than the client in question, considerations of horizontal equity may
favor making it available to this client as well. Second, an action by
the lawyer that would have no significant effect on anyone but herself
is less valuable than one that would contribute practically to vindicating relevant legal merits.
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Nevertheless, such concerns cannot be routinely conclusive. Individual lawyers should be willing to consider that the prevailing
practices of the bar may fail to live up to the relevant standards of
the legal culture and even that legal standards may be out of step
with the broader surrounding culture. The law demands such consideration from other occupations - most famously, tugboat owners 98
and there is no reason why it should ask less of lawyers. The
lawyer also has an interest in her own moral integrity (and perhaps
the legal system has an interest in avoiding what the bar calls "even
the appearance of impropriety") that is at least partly independent of
the practical consequences of the lawyer's actions on others.
Moreover, lawyers in fact have greater influence over clients than
the criticism implies. Sometimes, lawyers have influence because their
clients are unsophisticated or poor. (A lawyer should be careful not
to exercise influence over such clients irresponsibly, but when it is
clear that a claim or course of action lacks merit, a client's vulnerability is no reason to go ahead with it.) Also, some clients consider
themselves bound by norms of legal merit and justice and are receptive
to advice that it would be improper to pursue courses of action that,
although arguably permissible, frustrate important legal ideals.
It is a mistake to think that narrowly economic concerns swamp
ethical concerns in the calculations of even selfish people. One important way in which ethical norms acquire clout is through status
distinctions. When ethical norms are successful, they confer prestige
on those identified with them and degradation on those perceived to
violate them. Stepping into a role thus degraded has costs that deter
people with better opportunities and abilities from doing so. And
association with such a role entails costs that may deter clients. The
degradation of a practice in this manner can thus inhibit it both by
reducing the number and quality of the people willing to perform it
and by stigmatizing clients on whose behalf they do so. For example,
there have been some areas of the country in which low risk bribery
has been common in connection with transactions such as tax abatements and building inspections. Some segment of the bar has always
been willing to facilitate such deals, but the unwillingness of elite
practitioners, as well as most others, to facilitate them has probably
helped limit the practice. Some assert that pressure from elite law
students whom Covington & Burling was trying to recruit prompted
the firm's dissociation from South African Airways. 99 If that is true,
it illustrates that practical pressure can arise from what the discretionary approach indicates is ethically correct analysis.
Of course, such matters are highly speculative. We know very
little about the practical limits on ethical decisionmaking, in part
98 See The T.J. Hooper, 6o F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
99 See Morgan, supra note 29, at A35, col. I.
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because of the confidential nature of practice and in part because these
limits are so rarely tested. However, it seems likely that these limits
vary widely among different clients and contexts of practice. This
suggests that the discretionary approach is correct to insist that these
limits be confronted strategically in each particular case, rather than
in some general lowering of ethical standards.
Finally, it should be emphasized that the value of ethical analysis
is not confined to situations in which the individual practitioner is
able to implement its conclusions. First, when the lawyer feels compelled to undertake a practice with little merit, the discretionary analysis emphasizes the moral costs of doing so. To one who believes that
ethical self-consciousness has intrinsic value, this should be important.
In addition, the analysis encourages the lawyer to watch for opportunities to expand her autonomy by avoiding this kind of representation. Second, the analysis ought to be of value to lawyers who are
not yet committed to particular areas of practice where ethical discretion is especially constrained. If, for example, the conditions of tax
practice require practitioners to exploit to the hilt the discrepancies
between public purposes and their formal legislative expression, 10 0
then lawyers who have a choice might want to avoid tax practice.
Third, practitioners might be able to achieve collectively what none
may achieve individually. Ethical analysis remains relevant at the
rulemaking level even when discretion is radically constrained at the
individual level.
E. Guidance and Notice
Lawyers sometimes complain that informal professional responsibility norms are too indeterminate to provide adequate guidance to
lawyers faced with ethical problems or adequate notice to lawyers
faced with regulatory sanctions. 1 1 The complaint raises somewhat
distinct concerns when it involyes what the Code calls "aspirational"
reflection as opposed to when it involves compliance with disciplinary
rules.
With respect to "aspirational" reflection, "guidance" has two different meanings in these complaints. Sometimes it simply means precepts that are helpful in structuring efforts to think through the issues.
I argued above that the discretionary approach does provide this sort
of guidance. Sometimes, however, "guidance" means specific instructions designed to make it unnecessary to think through the issues.
The discretionary approach is short on this kind of guidance, but it
100 George Cooper suggests that tax practice is moving toward this point but that it is still
subject to the waning influence of a more purposive view. See Cooper, supra note 44, at 157792.
101

See, e.g., Hazard, supra note ii, at 571-74.
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is not clear that a plausible ethical doctrine could or should try to
provide it. Many widely held views of moral life and professional
judgment include as a defining feature the willingness to wrestle with
the difficulties of ap'plying general norms to particular circumstances.
For centuries much of the attraction and dignity of the professional
life has been associated with the challenge of such complex judgments.
Were the issues of legal ethics ever reduced to a matter of unreflective
rule-following, many would cease to regard them as issues of ethics
at all.
When it comes to disciplinary rules, the demand for determinacy
is more strongly grounded. Here the argument is that the lawyer is
entitled to notice sufficient to enable her to comply before she is
subjected to coercive sanctions. In fact, however, the discretionary
approach is capable of elaboration in a manner that would be sufficiently determinate to serve as a basis for discipline.
The discretionary approach suggests that disciplinary rules should
ideally be expressed as rebuttable presumptions - as instructions to
behave a certain way unless circumstances indicate that the values
relevant to the rule would not be served by doing so. The rules would
be elaborated less by categorical specifications and more by discussions
of the general values expressed in the rule and by examples, in the
fashion of common law elaboration. Rules of this sort would leave a
substantial range of autonomy to those subject to them, but discipline
would be appropriate when someone failed to apply the rules in good
faith or with minimal competence.
Now I do not believe that lawyers who protest that such a disciplinary regime would be unfair because indeterminate should be heard
with much patience. I noted above that officials routinely make decisions in our system under general norms in a discretionary manner.
These official decisions entail severe and sometimes disastrous consequences for nonlawyers. A businessperson can suffer major financial
loss because a judge decides that she has not acted in "good faith" or
in accordance with "usage of trade."10 2 A doctor can suffer severe
financial and professional loss for violation of a norm that is defined
only as "reasonable care." A military officer can have his career
10 3 It
destroyed for "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman."
is remarkable to see a profession consisting of people recruited, socialized, and trained with the preeminent goal of inculcating a capacity
for normative judgment insisting that the norms that govern them be
spelled out at a level of detail that would obviate such judgment.

102 See, e.g., U.C.C. § I-201(9) (1978) (stating that the buyer in ordinary course is one who
has bought in good faith); id. § 1-205 (outlining course of dealing and usage of trade); id. § x208 (stating that the option to accelerate at will requires good faith).
103 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 738 (1974).
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Nevertheless, the value of the discretionary approach does not
depend on the enactment of a regulatory regime of informal norms.
A regulatory authority might conclude that in one or more areas only
categorical norms would be practically enforceable. Here the role of
the discretionary approach would be mainly to emphasize the moral
costs of categorical norms and to encourage that they be used sparingly. Once enacted, however, even a relatively categorical regulatory
regime is likely to leave the lawyer some significant range of practical
autonomy. The discretionary approach would suggest how decisions
should be made within the range of that autonomy.
Moreover, decisions of legal merit, even when not subject to discipline, ought not to be considered private matters. Because of both
intellectual controversy and enforcement constraints, disciplinary rules
are always an incomplete expression of the profession's norms of legal
merit; they should not preempt the full range of professional criticism
and review. The "Ethical Considerations" of the Code, for example,
perform the valuable function of acknowledging that coercively enforced rules are not the only professional norms applicable to practice
and suggesting that decisions within the range of autonomy left by
the rules are not exempt from criticism. Whether undertaken by
formally organized agencies of the bar or by individual lawyers and
informal groups, public nondisciplinary review and criticism would
be an important part of any attempt to implement the discretionary
approach.
F. The Tradition of the "Adversary System"
Another complaint is that the discretionary approach is inconsistent
with the traditional commitment of our legal culture to the principles
of the "adversary system.' 04 The complaint misunderstands both our
legal tradition and the discretionary approach. Regardless of what
the "adversary system" means, it does not adequately describe the
relevant aspects of the American tradition of advocacy. In that tradition, the lawyer has been both an advocate and an "officer of the
court" with responsibilities to third parties, the public, and the law.
There has never been a consensus about where to draw the line
between these two aspects of the lawyer's role, and the two have
0 5
always been in tension within the professional culture.'
104 See, e.g., Gathering, supra note 17, at 651 (remarks of Monroe Freedman).
105 Outside the professional culture, our tradition has been one of lay disapproval of many

of the characteristics associated with adversarial advocacy. See The Lawyer and His Clients Correspondence of Messrs. David Dudley and Dudley Field, of the New York Bar, with Mr.
Samuel Bowles, of the Springfield Republican (1871) [hereinafter Correspondence],reprinted in
A. KAUFMAN, supra note 16, at 424-44; Post, supra note 76, at 379-83.
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The complaint appears to conflate the adversary system with the
"arguably legal" advocacy standard, but even if we focus exclusively
on the adversarial elements of our tradition, it is far from clear that
the libertarian approach to ethics is central or essential. Comparative
law scholars suggest that the core of the adversary system lies more
in the notion of party autonomy - the conferral of responsibility for
defining issues and presenting evidence on the advocates instead of
the officials - rather than in the notion of partisan advocacy.10 6 Some
would insist that the term denotes a measure of partisanship, but this
need not disqualify the discretionary approach, which makes room
for a good deal of it.
The distinctive feature of the discretionary approach is not the
repudiation of partisan advocacy but the insistence that such advocacy
be undertaken in good faith as a reasonable means of vindicating the
relevant legal merits. This view seems to be at least as well grounded
in American legal tradition as the libertarian one. The libertarian
approach has never been unchallenged within the profession, and it
appears not to have been widely accepted before the late 19th century. 10 7 In the late i8th and early 19 th centuries, the dominant view
emphasized a commitment to public responsibility and complex normative judgment in a manner that resembles the regulatory and discretionary approaches more than the libertarian one. The compilations of ethical precepts by Daniel Hoffman in 1817 and George
Sharswood in 1854, which are often regarded as the foundations of
contemporary professional discourse, repeatedly prescribe complex
judgment under general norms of justice. For example, Hoffman
wrote:
In civil cases, if I am satisfied from the evidence that the fact is
against my client, he must excuse me if I do not see as he does, and
do not press it: and should the principle also be wholly at variance
with sound law, it would be dishonourable folly in me to endeavour
to incorporate it into the jurisprudence of the country, when, if successful, it would be a gangrene that might bring death to my cause

of the succeeding day. 10 8

Sharswood insisted that "[c]ounsel have an undoubted right, and are
in duty bound, to refuse to be concerned for a plaintiff in the legal
See, e.g., M. DAMA9KA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 3 (1986).
See Patterson, Legal Ethics and the Lawyer's Duty of Loyalty, 29 EMORY L.J. 909, 912
(198o); R. Gordon, Lawyers as the American Aristocracy (x985) (unpublished manuscript on file
with author).
1082 D. HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 755 (2d ed. 1836) (emphasis in original).
Hoffman's approach resembles the regulatory approach in its categorical commitment to substance over procedure. See id. at 754 (arguing that unmeritorious defenses may not be raised
for settlement leverage and that the statute of limitations and infancy may not be pleaded against
a substantively valid claim).
106

107
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pursuit of a demand, which offends his sense of what is just and
right.' 10 9 American legal traditions thus amply support the distinctive
features of the discretionary approach.
G. The Unpopular Client
Another frequent objection to enlarging the ethical discretion of
lawyers summons up the image of the "unpopular client." The fear
is that once lawyers engage in anything more than minimal scrutiny
of the merits of client goals and claims, "unpopular" people - dissidents, nonconformists, and outcasts - will be unable to find a lawyer.
This situation would thwart law's commitment to treat all evenhandedly and to stand above social prejudice. The argument is often
accompanied by references to famous incidents in which lawyers courageously defended victims of red scares, religious persecution, and
mob violence. 10
We can get a sense of the problems with this argument by considering the lawyering that prompted its most famous articulation - the
representation of Jim Fisk and Jay Gould by David Dudley Field in
the Erie Railroad control contests of the late i86o's. In an exchange
of letters following the contest, the newspaper editor Samuel Bowles
criticized Field for helping Fisk-and Gould in activities that injured
the railroad, its stockholders, and the economy."' Field and his son
replied that Field had done no more for Fisk and Gould than "giving
them legal opinions and arguing cases for them in court," and that he
had a duty to do this so that they would "be judged according to the
law of the land" rather than by "popular clamor.""n 2 Field invoked
Lord Erskine's defense of Tom Paine, in the face of public vilification,
against charges of seditious libel arising from the publication of The
Rights of Man. Erskine had responded to popular derision by proclaiming, "I will forever, at all hazards, assert the dignity, independence and integrity of the English bar, without which impartial justice
...can have no existence."" 3 Field argued that the same principle
applied to his representation of Fisk and Gould.
Whereas the activities that prompted the public clamor against
Erskine's client involved the publication of a controversial book, the
activities that prompted the public clamor against Field's clients involved the looting of the Erie Railroad and the fraudulent manipulation of its stock. That, at least, is how many informed, disinterested
109 G. SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 39 (2d ed. i86o).
110

Cf. MODEL CODE, supra note 4, EC 2-27 (arguing that the "lawyer should not decline

representation because a client or a cause is unpopular or community reaction is adverse').
111 See Correspondence, supra note ios, at 424-44.
112 Id.

at 429, 431.
113 Id. at 430.
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observers have viewed it.11 4 Field, however, might have viewed it

differently because some of the claims he asserted on behalf of Fisk
and Gould were upheld in the New York Supreme Court and the
contest was resolved substantially in favor of his clients by an act of
the New York legislature.
However, the judiciary that sustained the claims was highly politicized, partly corrupt, and organized in a way that made it incapable
of resolving the matter effectively, and many members of the legislature had been bribed by Gould. Field does not appear to have been
involved in the bribery of the legislators, but he was a general in the
notorious war of injunctions in the lower courts. Field's clients and
their adversary, Commodore Vanderbilt, would each in turn apply to
a friendly judge, who would promptly enter ex parte the requested
order vacating prior orders entered by other judges at the behest of
the opposing party and enjoining the opposing party in accordance
with the wishes of the applicant. 115 The state code of civil procedure
drafted by Field facilitated this chaos by effectively giving trial judges
in different districts statewide venue and jurisdiction without providing an adequate method of resolving conflicting decrees.
From the point of view of the discretionary approach, this was a
striking case of the kind of procedural failure that triggers responsibility to assess substantive merit. It was not plausible to think that
the court, given its staffing and organization, was reliably equipped
to resolve the matter justly. Thus, Field was wrong to think he had
no duty to assess the substantive merits of his clients' claims. Those
who have made such an assessment have tended to conclude that the
116
claims had no merit at all.
The relevance of this analysis to the "unpopular client" argument
is to illustrate that whether one should be concerned about a client's
unpopularity depends on what the source of the unpopularity is. If
unpopularity reflects a valid assessment of the legal merits of the
client's claims and goals, there should be no concern at all. Of course,
the lawyer ought not to accept unquestioningly lay public judgments
of legal merits, but when her own judgment agrees with the public's,
the client's unpopularity is no reason to assist him. Of the many
distinctions between Erskine's situation and his own that Field ignored
was that the claims of Erskine's client had considerably more legal
merit. They were strongly grounded in legal norms of free speech.
114 See, e.g., C. ADAMS & H.

ADAMS, CHAPTERS OF ERIE AND OTHER ESSAYS 1-99, 135-

91 (i886); M. KLEIN, THE LIFE AND LEGEND OF JAY GOULD 81-98 (1986).
15 Field was alleged to have offered $5ooo to a political crony of a judge then favoring the
Vanderbilt camp to persuade the judge to modify an injunction that he had refused in open
court to modify. The charge was never resolved. See C. ADAMS & H. ADAMS, supra note 114,
at 36-37.
116 See id.; Correspondence, supra note lo5, at 431-33, 440-44.
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The other classic examples of civil representation of unpopular clients,
such as those involving civil rights demonstrators or victims of red
scares, are also compelling because the claims of the clients had strong
merit, often grounded in the first amendment. Under the discretionary
approach, this merit provides a compelling reason for a lawyer to take
the case.
Moreover, in practice, libertarian ethics seem to have made little
contribution to the bar's willingness to represent "unpopular clients"
in civil liberties cases. The typical "unpopular client" in the civil
liberties area is unable to pay the costs of representation and thus
depends on the willingness of lawyers to take such cases pro bono.
Yet, in pro bono cases, lawyers have always made judgments of legal
merit. Survey evidence indicates that lawyers tend to be considerably
more committed to substantive civil liberties values than the lay public
n 7
is.
This commitment, I submit, and not the bar's commitment to
libertarian ethics, accounts for its admirable service to unpopular
clients with meritorious civil liberties claims. It is the bar's traditional,
albeit inconsistent, commitment to civil liberties that deserves veneration and elaboration.
H. Personal Values
Legal ethics are usually defended in terms of legal norms, but
especially in recent years, they have occasionally been defended in
terms of extralegal personal values. Some such arguments suggest
that the attorney-client relation defined by the libertarian approach is
an intrinsically valuable expression of personal trust and loyalty that
should be fostered and protected." 8 Raising the lawyer's responsibility to values and people outside the relation would undermine these
personal values.
One problem with this argument is that it ignores some salient
aspects of lawyering. Much lawyering is done for impersonal organizations. To be sure, lawyers have personal relations with individual
representatives of these organizations, but they owe their professional
duties not to these individuals, but to the impersonal organizational
entity or to large numbers of beneficiaries, shareholders, or members
with whom they have no personal relation at all." 9 Lawyering that
is done directly for individuals often can be done efficiently only on
a high volume basis that provides little opportunity for developing a
117 See J. HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS 145-46, 149-51 (1982); H. MCCLOSKY
& A. BRILL, DIMENSIONS OF TOLERANCE 245-47 (1983).
118 See, e.g., Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client
Relation, 85 YALE L.J. io6o, io66 (1976).
119 See MODEL CODE, supra note 4, EC 5-18 (duty owed to "entity"); MODEL RULES, supra
note 4, Rule 1.13 (duty owed to "organization").
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personal relation with clients. Moreover, the personal perspective
ignores the commercial dimension of most practice. In substantial
part, lawyers are in it for the money, and the bar explicitly authorizes
them to betray their clients in many situations in which their financial
interests are at stake. 120
Second, the personal approach requires us to define the value of
lawyering without reference to law, or to put it differently, to demand
a kind of deference that law gives to virtually no other personal
relations. Law is the least personal mode of social order. People
resort to law to the extent more personal modes of order fail or when
they fear these modes will fail. With few exceptions, the law requires
that personal relations yield to its purposes. 12 1 Moreover, many of
the most compelling issues of legal ethics arise from situations in which
loyalty to the client requires the lawyer to contribute to an injury to
some other personal relation in which the client is involved. From a
personal perspective, it is not clear why the lawyer-client relation
should be preferred to the relations it damages.
Finally, another feature of the lawyer-client relation envisioned by
the traditional adversary view suggests that it should not be highly
valued, even in strictly personal terms. This is the absence of reciprocity in loyalty. The lawyer is supposed to be loyal to the client's
goals, but the client has no duty of loyalty to the lawyer's goals, even
those that are integral to her conception of justice. This means that
the relation may require the sacrifice of some of the lawyer's most
basic commitments. Lawyers such as Daniel Hoffman and George
Sharswood viewed this aspect of the libertarian approach as intolerably degrading.
Any acceptable conception of the lawyering role should afford
opportunities for satisfying personal relations between lawyers and
clients. What the discretionary approach suggests is that these satisfactions should be grounded in a shared commitment to norms of
legality and justice or, at least, in a coincidence of the client's goals
with such norms.
I. Cognitive Dissonance
I argued above that the discretionary approach could accommodate
a high degree of aggression in advocacy, subject to the qualification
120 See, e.g., MODEL CODE, supra note 4, DR 4-Ioi(c) (allowing a lawyer to breach confidences when necessary to collect a fee); id. DR 2-1Ixo(C)(s)(f) (allowing a lawyer to withdraw if
her client deliberately fails to pay the fee); MODEL RULES, supra note 4, Rule x.6 (allowing a
lawyer to breach confidences to establish a claim in a controversy between herself and the
client); id. Rule i.i6(b)(4) (allowing a lawyer to withdraw if her client, after reasonable warning,
fails to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the lawyer's services); id. Rule i.i6(b)(5)
(allowing a lawyer to withdraw if the respresentation will cause an unreasonable financial burden
on the lawyer).
121 For example, the legal system stands ready to compel the testimony of parent against
child, sibling against sibling, and friend against friend.
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that aggressive advocacy must be part of a good faith effort to vindicate legal merit. One contemporary justification for libertarian ethics challenges this precept by suggesting that any direct integration
into the lawyering role of responsibility for the merits will impair the
lawyer's ability to represent clients in a way that best contributes to
appropriate resolutions. 122
The argument is based on a theory of cognitive dissonance - the
tendency of preconceptions to validate themselves by obscuring inconsistent data. It asserts that adjudication is most reliable when the
judge decides the case after a proceeding in which each side develops
as effectively as possible the arguments and evidence favorable to its
claims. The lawyer contributes best to such a proceeding by developing her presentation with a strong psychological commitment to her
client's claims. Responsibilities to third parties, the public, or norms
of merit would interfere with such a commitment. They would require
her to entertain hypotheses about the ultimate merits of the client's
claims early in the proceeding, potentially blinding 'her to considerations favorable to her client that she might otherwise have per23

ceived. 1

Even if this theory were correct, it would not be fatal to the
discretionary approach. If adopting a strong presumption in favor of
the client's claims is the best way for the lawyer to contribute to an
effective adversary presentation, and if an effective adversary presentation is the best way for the lawyer to contribute to the appropriate
resolution of the matters in issue, then under the discretionary approach the lawyer should adopt such a strong presumption. Even if
correct, however, the cognitive dissonance theory would not warrant
such a presumption in situations where the matter was not likely to
be resolved by adversary proceedings. Nor would it warrant the
presumption in adversary proceedings in which, because of some
anomaly or breakdown - for example, radically unequal access to
evidence or judicial bias - the general theory did not hold.
The theory is troubling to the discretionary approach, however,
because if correct and accepted, it would narrow the practical distance
between the libertarian and the discretionary approaches. When lawyers did apply the strong presumption, they would find themselves
more readily justifying aggressive tactics on the ground of legal merit
than they would be able to under a more balanced or dispassionate
view. It is thus worth emphasizing some of the reasons why the
cognitive dissonance theory seems wrong.
122 See,

e.g., Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAw 35, 43-45 (Berman

ed. 1972).

123To the extent that the cognitive dissonance argument is offered in support of the libertarian approach, it involves a partial non sequitur. Even if the most reliable procedure would
have each lawyer adopt a strong bias in favor of her client, that would not warrant the lawyer's
pressing the client's claim when she concluded, despite her bias, that the claim ought not to
prevail.

1140

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1011o83

First, the proponents of this theory have never been able to formulate an adequate account of it. Their theory has rested on the
notion that opposing biases somehow neutralize each other, rather
than simply creating confusion. But they have never explained why
this is so.
Second, in other areas, ranging from business planning to scientific
investigation, where making an accurate decision among a variety of
contested positions is important, decisionmakers rarely adopt the
method of adversary presentation by biased advocates. 12 4 The most
common approach is to have the participants approach the question
with an open mind and in good faith, rather than have them commit
themselves arbitrarily to a position and try to make the most of it.
The rejection of the adversary approach in other contexts suggests
that its perpetuation in the legal sphere has more to do with individualist or antistatist political ideologies or the reluctance of lawyers to
oppose clients than with its superiority as a mode of accurate decisionmaking.
Third, the theory probably does not even accurately depict the
methodology of partisan advocates in adversary proceedings. As I
noted above, a plausible theory of advocacy has to acknowledge the
importance of entering into the judge's perspective as well as the
client's. The advice of successful advocates often turns the cognitive
dissonance theory on its head. They caution that a strong presumption
in favor of the client may blind the advocate to opposing considerations that will be important to the judge, leaving the lawyer unprepared to meet these concerns at trial. 125 New lawyers often adopt the
cognitive dissonance theory instinctively, sometimes with disastrous
consequences, when they find that they have focused so intently on
developing their own cases that they have failed to think through,
and thus have nothing to say in response to, opposing counsels' points.
J. Confidentiality
Some defenders of the libertarian approach assert that it is supported by the policies and values underlying the evidentiary privilege
124 See Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 823, 84347 (x985); Luban, supra note 93, at 93-96.
125 See, e.g., R. KEETON, supra note 20, at 6-8; see also C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL
ETHICS 2 (1986) (suggesting that, other than rule knowledge, the central characteristic of the
legal role is "detachment" from the perspective of the client). This point relates to the argument
that, regardless of whether pro-client intellectual biases are desirable in theory, they will become
pervasive in practice under a discretionary regime because clients will seek out lawyers predisposed in favor of their goals. In fact, clients pay a cost for such loyalty, since a lawyer with
strong pro-client biases loses some capacity to anticipate the reaction of third parties and the
government to the client's activities. Thus, some suggest that the dominant incentives would
favor lawyers with independent perspectives, even if such lawyers have a greater sense of public
responsibility. See Berle, Book Review, 76 HARv. L. REv. 430, 431-32 (1962); H. HART & A.
SACKS, supra note 22, at 262-63.
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and broader professional obligation of confidentiality. 126 In contrast
to the arguments based on the putatively personal value of the lawyerclient relation discussed above, these defenses invoke values of procedural fairness and accurate decisionmaking. Although the discretionary approach is compatible with a broad range of positions on
confidentiality, it has greater affinity for relatively limited and flexible
ones. 1 27 Thus it is worth noting some of the reasons to doubt the
claims made for more far-reaching and categorical confidentiality obligations.
One of the arguments for broad confidentiality is that any greaterthan-minimal obligation to disclose adverse information will encourage
lawyers to rely on opposing counsel to give them information, thus
creating a disincentive for lawyers to develop their own cases fully.
Yet if we assume that lawyers would exchange relevant information
routinely under a discretionary ethical regime, it is hard to see this
argument as an objection. The legal system has no interest in encouraging duplicative efforts at discovering information or in unnecessarily increasing the difficulty of discovering it. On the other hand,
if we assume that lawyers will not routinely disclose relevant information (because they will violate discretionary disclosure norms or
find exceptions to them), then there would continue to be ample
incentive for each lawyer to prepare thoroughly.
Sometimes the argument for nondisclosure is put in fairness terms.
The claim is that the clients have a proprietary interest in information
developed by their lawyers, which would be violated by forced disclosure to the other side. This is quite a different claim from the first
one because the right it asserts, if recognized, would compete against
the legal interest in accurate decisionmaking. There is, however, no
basis for such a right sufficient to trump this legal interest. The legal
system rarely recognizes such claims with respect to information in
the hands of third parties. It is not sufficient to say that the client is
paying for the lawyer's services and therefore has a proprietary interest
126 See, e.g., M. FREEDMAN, supra note 4, at 1-8.

127 See, e.g., Subin, The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent
Harm, 70 IowA L. REv. 1091, 1172-81 (1985) (advocating mandatory disclosure "to prevent

serious harm"). In line with their categorical proclivities, defenders of strict confidentiality like
to compare the sweeping privilege they favor with a regime of no privilege at all. See, e.g.,
Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals:Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 66 VA. L. REv. 597, 6o6xx (I98O). Obviously, however, there are plausible intermediate points. For example, the
confidentiality obligation might be qualified by a duty to disclose when necessary to avoid
substantial injustice, or as Harry Subin proposes, when necessary "to prevent serious harm,"
Subin, supra, at 1173, or when a third party had a substantial need for the information and
could not obtain it elsewhere; cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) (exception to attorney work product
privilege); Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970) (qualifying a corporation's
attorney-client privilege in shareholders' derivative action), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (i97i).
Before the 2oth century, the English and American bars operated under much narrower and
more ambiguous confidentiality safeguards than they do now. See Hazard, An Historical
Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CALIF. L. REv. Io61, IO69-9i (1978).
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in the information she develops. What the client can expect to get
for her money depends on what the rules are and on how much of
her discretion the lawyer puts up for sale. If the rules require disclosure, or if the lawyer is committed to it and makes her position clear
to the client, the client cannot expect confidentiality by virtue of her
payment. Perhaps a client has some limited claim to information that
has been especially expensive to develop. But such a claim could be
satisfied best by requiring a party seeking disclosure to pay some
8
reasonable portion of that expense.12
Another - and perhaps the best known - argument for strict
confidentiality appeals to values of accurate decisionmaking and focuses on the client's incentives to disclose relevant information to the
lawyer. The argument is that if the client knows that the lawyer
might turn over adverse information to the other side, she will withhold information from the lawyer and thus compromise the lawyer's
ability to represent her. 129 As a normative matter, the argument's
priorities seem perverse. The argument shows greater solicitude for
the withholding client than for the opposing party who will be harmed
by nondisclosure, even though the only thing we know about the
client is that she is irresponsible, and we know nothing about the
opposing party.
Also, the argument's empirical premises are unverifiable and not
powerful intuitively. People would have ample incentives to disclose
adverse information to counsel even without confidentiality safeguards
because they are honest and law-abiding, because they cannot make
reliable judgments about when it is in their interests to withhold, or
because in many business contexts they risk liability by failing to seek
good legal advice. The absence of an evidentiary privilege does not
appear drastically to inhibit disclosure to other professional advisers,
even to accountants, whose work overlaps that of lawyers. More
dramatically, even sophisticated people often volunteer self-inculpa128 Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(C) (providing for discovery of opposing party's trial preparation materials subject to, inter alia, duty to pay portion of expenses incurred in developing
them). In some circumstances, there may be practical difficulties in protecting the discloser's
interest in compensation. But, usually, the interest in a just disposition of the case, which
favors disclosure, will outweigh the compensation interest.
129 See, e.g., M. FREEDMAN, supra note 4, at 1-8. A variation on this argument, made by
the drafters of the Model Rules, is that the possibility of disclosure would inhibit clients from
mentioning harmful intentions in situations in which, if they had been mentioned, the lawyer
would have been able to dissuade the client from pursuing them. See MODEL RULES, supra
note 4, Rule 1.6, comment 9. The argument is not very impressive: although the lawyer may
gain a few opportunities to' try to dissuade her client because of the unqualified confidentiality
rule, she loses the leverage of threatened disclosure which gives her the best chance of succeeding.
Even the drafters did not take their own argument seriously. Their argument would apply only
to contemplated future harm, and it would apply most strongly to contemplated acts involving
the most serious harm. Yet the drafters excepted precisely such acts from the otherwise strong

confidentiality safeguard of Rule 1.6. See id. Rule i.6(b)(i).
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tory information to the police after Miranda warnings, apparently
0
from a natural compulsion to vindicate themselves. 13
Reduced confidentiality would probably entail some costs to
clients, but the important issue is whether these costs outweigh the
costs to third parties and the legal system from the prohibition of
disclosure. 13 1 I suspect that few nonlawyers find the balance struck
by the prevailing rules plausible, and even lawyers sometimes strike

the balance differently when they confront analogous issues involving
other professionals. Quoting a famous California case holding psychiatrists liable for failing to disclose patients' violent intentions, Deborah Rhode notes, "[w]hen self-interest is not at issue, many professionals, including lawyers, have concluded that 'the uncertain and
conjectural character' of threats to client confidence should not take
132
precedence over concrete risks to innocent third party victims."
K. Lawyer Motivations and Values
One could accept the arguments of this essay and still believe that
the world is better off to the extent that lawyers act as unreflective
rule-followers rather than as exercisers of discretionary judgment.
Perhaps lawyers are so motivated by material self-interest that they
would not make discretionary judgments about legal merit in good
faith. Or perhaps lawyers' substantive values and their insight into
legal merit and justice are so deficient that, although discretionary
judgment might be theoretically possible, it would lead to poor decisions in practice. Such possibilities, if true, would support the claim
that legal ethics should confine and regulate decisionmaking as rigidly
as possible through categorical rules.
Such arguments, however, require trust and confidence in the
people who make the rules. Under most current regimes, that means
lawyers. Still, the argument might be attractive to someone who had
more confidence in the elite of the bar, who exercise the rulemaking
power, than in the rank-and-file. Or one might believe that collective
rulemaking decisions by lawyers are more reliable than individual
ethical decisions, perhaps because the former are made in terms of
general norms in which the decisionmaker has a less personal stake,
130 See, e.g., Griffiths & Ayres, A Postscript to the Miranda Project:Interrogation of Draft
Protesters in New Haven, 77 YALE L.J. 300 (1967).
131 Although this rhetoric might strike some as excessively, utilitarian, an analogous issue
would arise under a "rights-based" perspective, since such an approach would have to consider
the effect of confidentiality on the rights of third parties as well as those of the client.
132 Rhode, EthicalPerspectives on Legal Practice,37 STAN. L. REv. 589, 616 (I985) (quoting
Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 439, 55I P.2d 334, 346, 13I Cal.
Rptr. 14, 26 (1976)). The Model Rules and the Code permit but, unlike Tarasoff, do not require
disclosure to protect third parties from serious physical harm. See MODEL CODE, supra note 4,
DR 4-IoI(C)(3); MODEL RULES, supra note 4, Rule i.6(b)(i).
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because they are made in high visibility settings, or because they are
subject to public controls. Thus, one could believe coherently that
lawyers can be trusted at the rulemaking level but not at the level of
individual decision, and that rules ought therefore to constrain individual decisionmaking rigidly.
This Article has little to say in response to such claims. Like most
discussions of lawyering, mine simply takes for granted that lawyers
are substantially motivated to act ethically and that they have a
capacity for reasonably good normative judgment. These premises
are not obviously correct, and they deserve critical investigation, although they have yet to receive much.133
Although the premises remain to be established, they are not arbitrary. They arise from the most basic of the traditional ambitions
of lawyers - the ideal of direct participation by the individual lawyer,
independent of both client and state, in the elaboration and implementation of legality and justice. The most serious criticism of the
libertarian and regulatory approaches is that they alienate the lawyer
from legality and justice. They do so by requiring her to do things
that violate her best judgment of how to vindicate legal merit and
justice (or would violate such a judgment if she were not discouraged
from making one), and by excessively subordinating the lawyer to the
client, in the case of the libertarian approach, and to the state, in the
case of the regulatory one. The discretionary approach is an attempt
to redeem the traditional ideal from the corruptions of a series of
jurisprudential mistakes.

The plausibility of the discretionary approach thus depends on the
plausibility of the traditional ideal. No doubt, one can easily find
instances of betrayal of the ideal to material self-interest or simply to
a moral and intellectual sloth averse to conflict and challenge. Nonetheless, many lawyers still regard the ideal as one of the attractions
of the professional life and experience disappointment to the extent
that it remains unfulfilled. The vindication of this ideal surely depends on changes in the organization and economics of practice. 134
Correcting the jurisprudential mistakes of the categorical approaches
is not a substitute for such changes, but like them, it is a prerequisite
to the redemption of the professional ideal.
IV. CONCLUSION

The fundamental defect of the prevailing approaches to legal ethics
lies in their premise that the legal enforceability or permissibility of a
133 One important exception is Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and ProfessionalAutonomy: Social
Values and Client Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REv. 503 (1985). See also
Simon, Babbitt v. Brandeis:The Decline of the Professional Ideal, 37 STAN. L. REV. 565, 57176 (1985) (commenting on Nelson).
134 See Gordon, supra note 3; Rhode, supra note 132, at 626-38.
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client's claim or course of action is an ethically sufficient reason for
assisting the client. The premise is mistaken for two reasons. First,
it ignores considerations of relative merit. It thus legitimates assisting
client goals that meet the threshold test of minimal merit, but that
have little merit relative to other goals the lawyer might assist. Second, it fails to confront adequately the tensions between substance
and procedure, purpose and form, and broad and narrow framing.
The premise that potential enforceability alone justifies assistance inappropriately relieves the lawyer of responsibility to assess the quality
of the relevant enforcement processes and to consider how she might
contribute most effectively in the particular case to improving their
capacity to vindicate legal merit. The premise that legal permissibility
alone justifies assistance ignores important legal values competing with
those that favor client autonomy and ignores that decisions may be
legally permissible and yet not best vindicate relevant legal merits.
By forcing the lawyer to confront more directly the norms of legal
merit in the particular case, the discretionary approach seeks to overcome these limitations.

